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CHAPTER I 
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
 
A. The development of International Human Standards 
 
The idea of human rights is  often linked to the philosophical traditions of 
Greek,   Roman,  and  Medieval  times. 1          Human  rights  theorists  often  refer  to 
Antigone, the  classic  example from  Greek  literature.  According to  Sophocles 
(1974), King Creon reproaches Antigone for having given her brother a burial, 
contrary to the law of the city (because her brother had fought against the polis). 
She responds that she was obligated to follow a higher, convention, which 
supersedes positive (man-made) law.2 
In the history of Western civilization prior to World War II, there were efforts 
 
of various kinds to promote individual rights at the national level. Western nations 
publicized such documents as the English Magna Carta (1215), the United States 
Declaration of Independence and Constitution (1776, 1787), and the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizens (1789).
3
 
During the nineteenth century, as Europeans came to realize the contradiction 
 
between their political values and the practice of  slavery, they instigated (bring 
about) an abolition movement. The sixteen Nation Agreement at Brussels in 1890 
established a comprehensive system for the suppression of the slave trade. England 
initiated  a number of bilateral treaties to secure the eradication of the slave trade, 
e.g.   the   1926   Slave   Convention.   The  abolition  of  slavery  remarked  at  the 
development  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  human  rights  (UDHR).   Other 
examples  of  abuses,  which  led  to  reform  movements,  include  mistreatment of 
 
 
 
I    
Szabo,   I,  Historical   Foundations  of  Human  Rights and subsequent  developments.  In 
K.Vasak & P.Alston (Eds), The International Dimensions of human rights, 1982 vol.l.,  11-12 (11- 
42)). 
2    
Sophocoles.(1974).  Antigone.  The Theban plays.  Hannondsworth:   penguin.  (Originally 
written 442-441 B.C) 
3    Alison   Dundes   Rentein,   International   Human  rights:  Universalism   Versus  Relativism 
(London: Sage Publications,  1990),  18. 
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Christians in Turkey, pogroms against the Jews in Russia, and violation of religious 
liberties in Spain. 
4
 
The Geneva Conventions of 1864,  1907,  and 1929  protected the rights of the 
wounded, civilian populations  and prisoners  of war during  armed conflict.'  The 
treaty of Vienna  guaranteed religious  liberties and civil rights for citizens in the 
proposed union of Belgium and Holland.
6
 
 
The League of Nations  and ILO played significant role as the progenitor of 
the modem UN. The treaty of Versailles and the league Council reemerged in the 
UN system in a slightly different form. The so-called mandates system allows 
individuals with grievances to bring claims before the league Council. Tolley says," 
for  the   first   time   some   nations   sates  became   regularly   accountable   to   an 
international  body  for  mistreatment  of  individuals  subject  to  their  rule'",  The 
principle behind the mandates system has survived in the trusteeship system of the 
UN, although not many "non-self-governing territories" remain.
8  
The only apparent 
 
human  rights  guarantees  existing  under  the  League  of Nations  pertained  to  the 
protection of minorities and indigenous populations in mandates territories. But in 
any  event,  the  league  was  mostly  ineffectual,  even  the  most  monstrous  crimes 
against humanity,  such as those  (carry out) perpetrated  by Hitler,  Mussolini,  and 
Stalin,  failed to  elicit  (bring  out)  serious  response  from  it. The  most  successful 
human rights  institutions  is the ILO whose  goal to ensure safe, humane,  and fair 
labor   standards.   It  was   exemplary   in   its  standard  setting  as  well   as  in  its 
enforcement techniques.
9
 
 
A  private  body,  the  Institute   of  International   law,  consisted   of  leading 
international  law scholars  from across the globe,  met at Briarcliff,  New  York,  in 
 
 
4 
Tolley, H. Jr. The UN Commission  on Human Rights (Boulder and London: Westview Press: 
1987,) P.l 
5    
Pictet,   J.   Development and Principles of International humanitarian law.   Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff; Geneve: Henry Dunant Institute,  l 985). 
6 
lbid. 
7   
Tolley H.  Jr.,  Decision-Making  at the UN Commission  on  Human  Rights,  1979-1982, 
Human Rights Quaterly,5, 27-57,  1983, p.2 
8  
Humphrey,  J.P. The International  law of Human rights in the middle twentieth century. In 
M.Bos (Ed.)The present state of international law and other essays (Deventer: Kluwer, 1973) p.80 
9  
Swepson,     L. Human Rights complaint procedures of International labor 
Organization.   In  H.   Hannum,   (ED.)   Guide  to  international  human  rights practice 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press  1984), 74-93 
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1929 to develop an "international Bill of Rights" In their first draft they set out what 
they regarded as state duties to respect individual rights." They include six specific 
articles: the rights to life, liberty, property, religious and linguistic freedom and to a 
nationality.  Although their effort did not produce any tangible results, some claim 
they greatly influenced  the  movement, which culminated  in  the  human rights 
provisions in the charter of the UN. 11 
 
Another memorable articulation of human rights ideals was president Franklin 
 
D. Roosevelt's  annual  message to Congress on January 26,  1941,  in which he 
-, 
advocated the 'four freedoms":  freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom 
from want, and freedom from fear. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill included these 
notions in the Atlantic Charter, which was drawn up August 14,  1941,  adding the 
need for self-determination,  economic progress, and  social security.
12   
The  pre 
 
history of  the UN ended. January 1942,  with  the  signing  by 26 nations of  the 
 
·         Declaration of the UN. The Moscow Declaration paved the way to the development 
 
·         of the UN organization by formally recognizing the need for such a world body.13 
 
The basis of work undertaken at the conference on International Organization 
was the  proposal developed at Dumbanton Oaks. Many  nations  and 
nongovernmental organization attended the conference, in which  a draft of the 
charter finally adopted. The UN charter was the first international agreement in which 
the countries of the world made a commitment to promote human rights at the 
international  level. In contrast to the League of Nations Covenant, the charter made 
explicit reference to human rights in its preamble and in  several different article 
(1, 13,55,62:2,68).  Other articles have proved to be instrumental  to those 
seeking to advance the cause of human rights (11,14,73).
14
 
 
The language pertaining to human rights that incorporated in the charter is 
vague.  It only  refers  to  fundamental human rights  in  the  most  general  terms. 
Consequently, there has been substantial disagreement over the extent to which it 
 
1
°Fareed,  NJ.  The  United nations Commission on Human rights and its  work for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.  Ph.d dissertation  (Washington  State  University: 
1977),p.26 
11  
(Drost, P, Human Rights as legal rights. Leiden: A.W.S. Uitgeversmi,  1951, p.19). 
12  
(Szabo, Ibid,  l 982,  p.22) 
13  
Fareed, Ibid,  l 977 p.28) 
14  
Ibid ,  31-33
5  
 
 
 
 
 
imposes legal  obligation upon its signatories.  The content of human rights duties 
held by state  is  vague, making  it  impossible  to determine the nature of their 
obligations. The vagaries of UN Charter may not permit to assume that states have 
\ 
incurred legal obligations by virtue of having ratified the instrument. It seems the 
language used is not strong enough to support obligations.
15
 
The most controversial provision in the charter was article 2 (7); 
 
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene 
in matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement under 
Chapter VII. 
 
Intervention  is justified only under Chapter VII� when the Security Council 
finds a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (article 39). 
The Security Council must interpret gross human rights violation as being serious 
enough to constitute a threat of war. 
16
 
In the UN, the main responsibility for advancing the cause of human rights 
belongs to the General Assembly. Under its auspices, the economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC-article 60) is authorized to pursue human rights activities. 
According to Article 60, the General Assembly may decide questions directly itself 
in sessions or rely on a report from one of the Assembly's seven main committees.17 
                                 Ordinarily, human rights issues are referred to the Third Committee, which is 
concerned with social, humanitarian, and cultural matters. 
 
Article 34 specifies that the Security Council investigate disputes which might 
give rise to international conflict. On occasion, the Trusteeship Council (article 76© 
and 87)  and the  ICJ  have decided human rights questions.  The Secretariat  is 
designated as a key human-rights actor in the charter as well (97-99). Under article 
13 (Ia)  of the charter, the General Assembly is responsible for the codification of 
 
 
 
15    
Driscoll,   D.J.  The Development  of  Human  Rights in   international   law.   In 
W.laqueur & B.Rubin (Eds.) The human  rights reader. New York: New American Library, 
1979, p.43  (41-56) 
16  
Tolley, Ibid,  1987,p.6-7 
17  
Schwelb,  E. & Alston, P. The principal institutions and other bodies founded under 
the Charter  In  K.Vasak &P.Alston  (Eds),  The International Dimensions of Human Rights 
(Vol. I .pp. 231-300 I). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982 p.232,( 231-301)
6  
- 
international  law.  It therefore  established the international Law commission (ILC) 
 
in 1947.
18
 
 
One of the most lasting contributions of the UN Charter was the establishment 
of a Commission on Human Rights, which was provided for in Article 62. In fact, it is 
the only Commission specifically referred to in the chapter. Pursuant to article 68, 
ECOSOC first set up a subsidiary  organ, the so- called Nuclear Commission on 
Human Rights, which initially  included nine members serving  in their personal 
capacity. AS its second session, in June 1946, ECO SOC established  the eighteen- 
member full Commission.  The principal  concerns of  the Commission were an 
international  bill  of  rights;  international   conventions of  specific  topics; the 
protection of minorities;  and the prevention of discriminations on the grounds of 
race, sex, language, or religion. 
In  1946 and 1947, ECOSOC authorized the Commission on Human rights to 
create subcommissions. Three such subcommissions were established, but only one 
has survived. At the same time that ECOSOC  set up the Nuclear Commission of 
Human Rights, it appointed a nuclear subcommission on the status of women. This 
subscommission met in the spring of 1946 and concluded that it did not wish to be 
"dependent on the pace of  another commission".
19   
The Council acceded to the 
 
request to tansform the subcommission into a Commission on the status of women. 
Evidently, there were those who objected to this development,  concerning it as 
discriminatory  for the UN to have a separate  body dealing with the rights of 
women.i" It was not clear what activities the Subcommissions would be authorized 
                      to undertake. However, it gradually has enlarged its own powers beyond what the 
commission had previously approved. As it has turned out, the subcommisison has 
 
                                become a de facto Subcommissions  on Human Rights despite its more narrow 
title.
21    
The Subcommision  has created working  groups whose function it is to 
 
investigate specifics types of human rights abuses, such as slavery, the subjugation 
of indigenous populations, torture, child labor, and others. It ha not only tried to set 
 
18
 
Sinclair,  I,  The international law commission. Cambridge:  Grotius  Publications, 
1987, 41-43. 
19  
(Humprey, 1984,p.19). 
20 
(Humphrey,  1984,p. l 9) 
21  (Tolley,   1987,p.168).
7  
 
 
 
 
international standards but it has also attempted to influence world public opinion. 
Research has been a key priority for the subcommission, and its most controversial 
activities have, in fact, been its self efforts to investigate human-rights  violations 
through fact finding. Alarmed by the Subcommission's "radical" nature, the 
commission tried to abolish it in  1951  but was prevented  from  doing so by the 
general Assembly, which cited an overriding commitment to the principle of 
nondiscrimination. 
The first and most important task that the commission on Human rights faced 
was drafting  an "International  Bill of Rights" at its  second  session  in  1947, the 
expectation  was  that  this  would  include  a declaration,  a  convention  on human 
rights, and methods of implementation.
22  
The Universal  of Declaration  of human 
 
rights is  often referred to as the "central document for the cause of human rights", 
which explains why the date its adoption, December 10,  1948, has been designated 
"Human Rights Day" by the United Nations.
23 
With its adoption, it became possible 
 
to interpret  the formerly obscure human rights provisions  of the UN charter and 
thus to substantiate claims of human rights violations. 
The Division of human rights received numerous proposals for the declaration 
from individuals  as well as organization.  When the Commission  began its work, it 
had eighteen drafts to consider.
24  
It is noteworthy that all the drafts came from the 
 
democratic West and that all but two were in English.
25 
                                         John Humprey, a director of the secretariat Division  of Human  Rights relied 
 
on the draft declaration  that had been sponsored at the San Fransisco  conference. 
He proposed  that economic  rights should be included  in the draft. "Human  rights 
without  economics  and  social  rights  have  little  meaning  for  the  most  people, 
particularly  on empty bellies. He takes credit for the fact that economic  rights end 
up  in  the  final  text.
26  
The  dominant  view  now  is  that  UDHR   constitutes  the 
 
authoritative  interpretation  of the human rights provisions  of the UN Charter. As 
such, it  is  legally  binding  on member nations. Another widespread  position is  that 
 
22  
Humphrey, 1984, p.260 
23 
Szabo, 1982, p.21. 
24  
Szabo,  1982, p.21 
25  Humphrey, 1984,p.3 l-3 l 
26  1984,p.32.
8  
the norms of the UDHR have become binding as part of customary  international 
law,  legal  principles  of  the  so-called  civilized  nations.  This  makes  standard 
applicable to all nations, whether or not they have expressed consent.
27
 
The  UDHR  contains  primarily  civil  and  political  rights  as  well  as a few 
economic, social and cultural rights. Evidently, it was because the Declaration was 
said to  be  without  legal effect that western  drafters  were  convinced  to  include 
economic, social, and cultural rights, as they would be nonjusticiable in character." 
There was a considerable conflict surrounding the UDHR. Arab states for example, 
challenged the right to change religion, a norm according to them was contrary to 
the tenets in the Koran.
29  
The soviet were opposed to the predominance  of Western 
 
civil liberaration. Those acquainted with the debates are forced to conclude: 
"Deliberation by the Commission and its drafting committee revealed profound 
ideological differences over what constituted universal rights"
30
 
There  is an allegation that human rights concepts  is a Western  one, the 
reson will become  transparent  if one examines the draft of UDHR.  The member 
ship of the drafting committee, the Commission on Human rights, and the UN as a 
whole were predominantly  Western. It was not until the 1950s that anticolonialism 
prevailed,   leading   to  the   formation   of  new   African   and   Asian   states.  The 
membership of the UN was most assuredly a critical factor in shaping the UDHR. 
The  movement  to  create  a new  international  apparatus  (device)  for the 
promotion of human rights was led largely by Americans. The US department State 
arranged  the  early  drafts  of a proposed  constitution."  The crucial  meetings  took 
place in the United  States. American NGOs were extremely  influential  during the 
formative stages of the commission and the UDHR.
32  
The efforts of more than forty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27     
Alison   Dundes   Renteln,  International    Human   Rights   Universalism   Versus 
Relativism  (London: Sage Publication, 1990) p. 29. 
 
28 
Tolley,  1987, p.21-22. 
29 
Tolley,  1987, p.22. 
30  (Tolley, 1987 ,p.21 ). 
31  Tolley,  1987,p.3 
32 
Humprey,  1979, 21
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private  organization   brought in as consultants by the US ensured that the Charter 
would contain some references to human rights.
33
 
Even the goal itself was described as drafting an "international Bill of Rights," 
language,  which  undeniably  reflects  an American  flavor.  Many  writers  refer to 
those who drafted the original human-rights documents  as "founders".
34   
Eleanor 
Rooselvet  was  said to  favor a two-stage  drafting  process  for  a declaration  and 
convention modeled after the US 'Declaration of Independence  an Bill of Rights.
35
 
Considering  the  mindset  of those  most  actively  involved  in the  drafting  of the 
original  human  rights  instrument,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  many  of the 
notions resemble western European and American political ideas: 
Everyone has the right to:                                       ;., 
 
*  life, liberty and security of person (3) 
 
"recognition everywhere as a person before the law (6) 
 
"freedom of movement ... to leave any country, including his own (13) 
 
*a nationality (15) 
 
*freedom of thought, conscience and religion (18) 
 
*freedom of peaceful assembly and association (article 20) 
 
*take part in the government of his country (21) 
No one shall be 
*held in slavery (4) 
"subjected to torture (5) 
"subjected  to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (9).
36
 
 
 
 
I submit  to you that what the thinkers of the Enlighment  did, and what the 
drafters  of the UD also strove to do, was to present  a set of ideals-of universal 
ideals on the limits of governmental authority, of goals to be attained, above all, to 
guarantee the individual respect for his dignity and a life of freedom from fear.. 
Is it not a truly a detestable form of racism to suggest that these should be the 
goals of Western civilization only and no bearing to the rest of the world'r" 
 
 
 
 
 
33  
Farer, 1987, 554) 
34  
Ibid 
35  
Tolley,  1987, p.21. 
36  
(Tolley, 1987,p.22-23. 
37  
(Schifter,   1988,p.2-3)
10  
The historical debates indicate that one of the major conflicts was the decision 
whether to have one or two covenants. Although  some preferred to have one on 
civil and political rights and another on economic, social and cultural rights, others 
regarded this division as being highly artificial. For those subscribing to the latter 
view, the two sets of rights were perceived as interdependent." 
At  first  the  UN  decided  to  have  all  the  rights  incorporated  m  a  single 
convention. This was the position officially taken at the fifth session of the General 
Assembly. A year later, however, responding to Western suggestion, the Assembly 
reversed  itself,  concluding  that it was, after  all, preferable  to  draft  two  separate 
conventions which would be completed concurrently and then open for signature by 
states on the same date. 
39
 
 
In  1966  the Covenants were finally presented  in the General  Assembly. 
The  International  Covenant  on Civil  and Political  Rights  (ICCPR)  received  106 
votes  in  favor  with  none;  the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and 
cultural might (ICESCR) received  105  votes with none against."  But, despite the 
fact that nations voted for the Covenants, this did not mean that they would ratify 
them promptly. Then years later, both Covenants  finally had received  the required 
thirty-five ratifications  needed to enter into force. The delay has been attributed to 
the ideological diversity in the UN. 
41
 
Since the mainstream view now is that the declaration is customary 
international  law  and  therefore  binding  on  member  states,  the  advantage  of the 
Covenannts  is  their  reporting  and enforcement  procedures.
42   
Whereas  the UDHR 
 
contained  a  combination   of political  and  economic  rights,  each  covenant  was 
devoted  to one kind only. Because Western opposition  to economic  rights was so 
entrenched,   it   seemed   advisable   to  have   separate   documents:"Realistically  it 
 
 
 
 
38  
(Szabo, 1982, p.29. 
39  
(Szabo, 1982, p.29) 
40 
(Farer, 1987 ,p.560). 
41  
(Tolley,1987, p.24). 
42  
Das,  K. United  Nations  institutions  and procedures  founded  on conventions  on 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. In K. Vasak & P.Alston (Eds.), The International 
dimensions of human Rights  vol.l,  Westport, CT: Greenwood  Press,1982,  330-334;  303- 
362).
 ' 
 
 
 
 
appeared that if Western government would obstruct a comprehensive covenant, 
two agreements would be preferable to none." 
43
 
One provision incorporated  into the ICCPR which may have contributed to 
the reluctance of the US to ratify the Covenant concerns free speech.  Specifically, 
several states insisted on a prohibition of speech advocating racial hatred and war. 
Even France joined  China and The Soviet Union among others in favor of the 
provision. Although the US managed to block the restrictive proposal for a few 
years, despite its  having been  recommended by  the  Subcommission, by  1953 
supporters of the exceptions were in the majority.
44
 
 
Western nations tried  to  prevent  the  amalgamation  of the  rights to  self 
determination but proved unsuccessful in this enterprise. This right became Article 
1    of both Covenants because of extensive support among the nations, which had 
fought colonialism.  Western states had advance the argument that vague collective 
rights do not belong with the guarantees of individual freedom. They also failed to 
secure language ensuring just compensation for nationalized property.
45
 
Enforcement of human rights standard also occurs at the regional level. The 
earliest and most established human-rights institutions  at the regional level are 
found in Western Europe. The three major organs of the European human rights 
system are the European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of 
human rights,  and the Council of Ministers. They derive their authority from the 
European  Convention  for  the  protection  of  human  rights  and  fundamental 
Freedoms, which was drafted by the Council of Europe and entered in to force in 
1953. The Conventions allows states (article 24) as well as individuals and NGOs 
(article 25) to bring a complaint against a state. Application are initially  reviewed 
by the Commission, which rules upon admissibility and facts.  If the complaint is 
valid, the Commission can attempt a friendly settlement.  If that fails, the case is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43  (Tolley, 1987, p.25). 
44  
Tolley, 1987, p.27 
45 {Tolley,  1987,p.27) 
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 referred  either  to  the  court  or  the  council  of  Ministers,  whose  decisions  are 
binding.
46
 
The organization of American States also set up human rights organization 
which was established in 1959. The inter-American Commission on Human rights 
issued   two   regional   documents,   which   serve   as   guidelines:   the   American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of man ( 1948)  and the American Convention 
on Human Rights (1969), which has not yet entered into force. In 1965 the 
commission's power were  extended to permit  it to  screen individual  complaints 
related to certain articles of the American declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man.  As consequence,  since  1966 the Commission  has heard complaints  against 
almost every OAS member state. This constitutes one.the most salient differences 
between the European Convention and the American Convention. Whereas the right 
of individual petition is optional under the former, it is automatic under the latter.
47
 
 
The Arab Commission  on Human rights was set up by the League of Arab 
States in  1968. Its main function has been drafting of agreement to submit to the 
Council of the League.  To date it lacks any power to review complaints from states 
or individuals.
48
 
 
The organization of African Unity adopted the African Charter of Human and 
People Rights and people rights in 1981.  It entered into force on October 21,  1986, 
and   according   to  article   45  authorizes   the  African   Commission   "to   collect 
documents,  undertake  studies  and researches  on African problems  in the field of 
human and people'  rights 
In   Asia,   proponents    of  regional   human-rights    tribunals   attempted   to 
orchestrate a series of seminars in Asia to replicate the successful regional seminars 
that led to the African charter, but their efforts met with little success.
49
 
An advantage of regional human-rights organization over international  ones is 
 
that the locally proposed  standards can be more compatible with indigenous values. 
 
 
 
46
Boyle,  K.  Practice  and procedure  on individual applications under the Europen 
conventions  on  human  rights.  In H.Hannum (ED.)  Guide  to international human rights 
practice, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984, pp.133-152 1984). 
47  
Driscoll  1979, p.51-52. 
48  
Driscoll,  1979, p.52). 
49  
.Tolley,  1987, p.158) 
 
 
 
12
13  
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently,  implementation  of those standards  is less  likely to be regarded as 
cultural imperialism.  States will be more inclined to comply with rules, which are 
concordant with their political culture. For those seeking universal  human rights, 
however, this may present a problem. To the extent that regional standards conflict 
with international  ones, claims to universality may be jeopardized.  It is precisely 
this issue, which lies at the heart of the entire human-rights movement, namely the 
tension between universalism and relativism.i'' 
B. Concept of Human rights 
 
The classic definition of human rights is a right, which is universal and held 
by all persons: 
 
A human rights by definition is a universal moral right, something which all 
men, everywhere, at all times ought to have, something of which no one may be 
deprived without a grave affront  to justice, something which is  owing to every 
human being simply because he is human". 
 
 
According to Wasserstrom, any true human rights must satisfy at least four 
requirements: 
 
 
First, it must be possessed by all human beings, as well as only by human 
beings. Second, because it is the same right that all human rights are possessed by 
all human beings, we can rule out as possible candidates any of those rights which 
one might have in virtue of occupying any particular status or relationship, such as 
that of parent, president, or promise. And fourth, if there are any human rights, they 
have the additional characteristic of being assertable, in  a manner of speaking," 
against the whole world. "
52
 
Natural law  was considered to be the standard against which all other laws 
were to be judged. To contest the injustice of a man-made law, one could appeal to 
the higher authority of God or natural law.  Eventually natural law evolved into 
natural rights, which are considered to be the modem manifestation of natural law. 
The change reflected a shift in emphasis from society to the individual. Where as 
natural law  provided a basis for curbing excessive  state  power, natural rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
so  Renteln, 37). 
51  (Cranston, M. What Are Human Rights, London: Bodley Head, l 973, p.36. 
52    Wassestrom,  R.,  Rights,  Human  Rights  and  racial  discrimination,  Journal  of 
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offered   a   means   by   which   an   individual   could   press   claims   against  the 
government. 
53
 
Waldron notes  that  natural rights  'seemed  peculiarly  vulnerable  to ethical 
skepticism'  but concludes, that "it would be wrong to suggest that the discussion of 
human rights  has been  seriously  impeded  or  obstructed  by  these  difficulties.r" 
Other conceptual  devices which have  provided  tentative  bases  for human rights 
include; the ability to use language, reciprocity, the capacity to conform to moral 
requirements, self-motivated  activity, self-consciousness,  and purposive  agency.SS 
Just as some philosophers  began to challenge the assumption that human nature 
could give rise to specific human rights. 
56  
Others question the ability of basic-needs 
 
theorists  to  delineate  or describe  in the  abstract  those  needs which  should give 
content to the idea of human rights. Presumably, adherents to this approach would 
not advocate the establishment of rights based on all needs. Someone must decide 
what needs are truly basic, and inasmuch as different judges will perceive different 
needs as taking highest priority, this approach does not circumvent the challenge of 
diversity. 
57   
There  is no way to prove the validity of any particular  interpretation 
 
because no procedure is established by which legitimacy of particular human rights 
can be judged. Indeed, there is some consensus among philosophers that up until the 
present,  all attempts  to provide  solid philosophical  foundations  for human rights 
have failed. 
58  
Many philosophers  employ Kantian notions as a vehicle  to advance 
 
human rights. As Feinberg has observed, however, the claims that human beings are 
 
"ends in themselves"  or sacred" or "of infinite value'  are themselves  in need of a 
foundation. 
59   
Kantian  moral  theory  assumes  the  existence  of  a single  pattern  of 
moral  reasoning.  The  abstract  rational  process  is presumed  to  bear  a single and 
                                    universal result, irrespective of cultural differences.
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Individual  behind  the  veil  of ignorance  stripped  of their  identity,  will 
select principles  of justice  by  which  society should operate.  One could  make a 
strong case that the contractarian scenario, which Rawls has devised is rigged or 
fixed.  For example, Rawls requires that persons in the original position be risk- 
averse and not be envious. By imposing  constraints such as these, Rawls ensures 
that individuals  in  the original position will agree to the principles he advocates. 
Thus the device provides an ex post facto justification  for his own personal moral 
convictions. 
The most  remarkable  example  of a scholar assuming that there  is a single 
correct pattern of moral reasoning can be found in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. His 
stage theory of moral development is perhaps the most blatantly universalistic moral 
theory one could imagine. Those surveyed who did not reason according to preconceived 
styles were considered to have retarded or hindered powers of moral reasoning. Among 
other things, his work has been challenged as failing to take into account gender 
differences.YIts  cross-cultural  validity is still hotly  debated.  But, the astounding 
nature of Kohlberd's presumption of universality is typified by his conclusion  in  an  
article  about  capital  punishment."  On  his  view,  reaching  the highest  stage  of 
moral development  entails rejection of the  death  penalty.  Even though  Kohlberg  
never  reveals  his  own  convictions,  it  seems  clear  that  these conclusions  may  reflect  
his  own  values.  Kohlberg's  moral  theory  represents  a classic example of the 
fallacies, which accompany the presumption  of universality. Needless to say, in the 
event one disagree with Kohlberg, e.g.,  on the defensibility of the death penalty, one's 
abilities in moral reasoning in moral reasoning are called into question. This kind of 
thinking typifies the universalist  position,  namely that alternative patterns of thought 
are dismissed from the outset. 
Problem with International HR Documents 
 
Several  provisions  from the UDHR  should demonstrate  the extent  to which 
the presumed universality of some human-rights provisions is called into question. 
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Article 17 provides that "Everyone has the right to own property alone as well 
as in association with others'  and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
property."   The   values   underlying   this   standard   is   hardly   universal.   One 
commentators refers to the problem with article 17 as one of cultural imperialism 
because  it " . . seeks to  impose  free enterprise and capitalism  on the  rest  of the 
world".
62  
Another human rights analyst rejects  the universality  of article  17  (91): 
"The community ideology does not admit of private property, except in consumer 
goods. 
63
 
 
Article  18,  19, 20 provide for rights to freedom of thought, religion, and 
association.  Article  21  guarantees  the  right  to  participate  in  government,  equal 
access to public service, and free elections. In article 2,l  (3) the ideological basis of 
the human rights standard is made manifest: 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
shall be expressed  in periodic  and genuine elections, which  shall be by universal 
and  equal  suffrage  and  shall  be  held  secret  vote  or  by  equivalent  free  voting 
procedures. 
From the third world perspective, Article 21  seeks to 'universalize Western- 
style  elections't'", which  are  obviously  not  universal:  "Monarchies,   dictatorship, 
single-party  rules,  or  single  candidate  elections  are  not  non-existent   in  today's 
world".
65
 
Article  16 provides for the right to marry and to found a family; article  16 (2) 
stipulates that marriage  shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of 
the intending spouses.  And,  finally,  article  16 (3) specifies  that the  family  is the 
natural and fundamental  unit of society, and is entitled to protection by society and 
the state . 
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 The phraseology suggests that only the immediate family can be understood to be 
the basic unit, which  would be appear to be insensitive to the many societies, which 
have different patterns  of social organization. The provision  guaranteeing voluntary  
choice  of marriage  partners  runs  counter  to  the  practice  of arranged marriages, 
which is an integral part of many value systems of the world.  Even the first  clause  
holding  that  there  is  a right  to  marry  and  found  a family  may be problematic 
when one considers that there have been many restrictions on the right to marry and 
procreate, which were at one time regarded  as moral by American, e.g., compulsory  
sterilization, prohibition of homosexual  marriages, and anti miscegenation laws. 
The  problem  with  the  particular  configuration  of rights  found  in  the 
UDHR is  that  some of the rights may not be compatible  with the diverse value 
systems of the  world.  Consequently,  the promulgation  of the UDHR  appears to 
many countries as the imposition of an alien value system: 
Thus, to the extent these kinds of rights are concerned, we have the scenario 
of one particular culture, or one particular political system claiming to be imposed 
upon the entire world ... .it is self-defeating  for the human-rights  movement to take 
the latter approach  and say, force private property upon the Soviet Union or china, 
or abolish arrange  marriages  in India, or force general elections  in Saudi Arabia, 
and then-  and here is the greatest danger of all-retire in the smug delusion  that 
having done that, justice has thereby been achieved for the individual." 
Since it is not possible to conclude that all cultures do share the same concept 
of human rights on the basis of evidence currently available, this means that cultural 
differences may raise significant problems.  The presumption  of universality  begins 
to  totter  when  it  confronts   divergent  interpretation   of humanitarian   standards. 
Nowhere is the contrast in values more striking in the cases of female circumcision 
and child labor. 
There are 3  types of female circumcision.  F.P. Hosken,  one of the opponents 
of the practice, offers the typology: 
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 1 
 
clitoris. 
 
2 
Sunna Circumcision:  removal  of the prepuce  or tip of  the 
 
 
 
Exicion or Clitoridectomy: Excision of the entire clitoris with
 
the labia minora and some or most of the external genitalia. 
 
3                              Excision  and  infibulation   (Pharaonic  Circumcision):   This 
means excision of the entire clitoris, labia minora, and parts of the labia majora. The 
two sides of the vulva are then fastened together in some way either by thorn  or 
sewing with catgut. Alternatively, the vulva is scraped raw and the child's limbs are 
tied together for several weeks until the wound heals (or she dies). The purpose is to 
close the vaginal orifice. Only small opening is left (usually by inserting a slither of 
wood) so the urine or later the menstrual blood can be passed, 67 
 
The specter of relativism also rears its head in the case of child labor. Today 
anywhere from 52  to 150  million children (- age 15) work throughout the world. 
The conditions  are  often  exploitative and unhealthy. As  a  consequence, many 
international community have focused their energies toward the complete 
eradication of all forms of child labor. 
Despite the presumption that child labor is entirely wrong, it is an economic 
necessity. In many societies, children are expected to help with the family business 
or to bring home substantial portion of the family income. It is an accepted part of 
the way of life in much of the worlds, and perceived as natural and moral. 
In  most agrarian societies, children work is  not only highly  prized for its 
economic utility but as representing the highest ideals of the culture, viz. obedii,nce, 
respect or filial piety. Serving those above one in the domestic hierarchy of age 
statuses is conceptualized as moral duty, often a sacred obligation.
68
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE ISLAMIC  PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A.  Belief in one God 
Belief in God is the most principle of Islamic teaching. The teaching of belief 
 
in one God is called tauhid in which Muslims belief that God is the only one who 
creates universe including human being. The Muslims believes in one God, eternal, 
creator, omnipotent, who sees all and knows all, infinitely good and merciful, who 
is  harsh on those who oppose him, and who forgives those who  ask him,  but 
punished the wicked severely. 
The existence of Allah is regarded as self-evident and the quran does not seek to 
prove it (even the prophet Muhammad did not necessarily prove it unlike other 
prophets) But the quran and Islam continually stress the oneness of God. Dr. Ismail 
Faruqi explains: The essence of Islam is its witness to the oneness of God (tauhid), or 
if one prefers it, the affirmation that there is no gods apart from ALLAH.  This tawhid  
restores  to  man  the dignity that  certain  religions  have  denied him by representing 
him as fallen or existentially wretched (heartbroken). In calling man to exercise these 
prerogatives given by God. Muslim preaching rehabilitates him and reestablishes him 
in his integrity, his innocence and his dignity. This moral vocation is the way to his 
success. Certainly, the Muslim is called to a new Theo centrism, but it will be that 
in which the cosmic dignity of man is applauded by God and by the angles.(Q.2:21) 
Creation  is  at the  forefront of Muslim thought. It is  the  great subject put 
forward by the quran for the continual meditation of the faithful. In the creation of 
the earth and the heavens, and in the alternation of night and the day, there are signs 
for men of sense; those that remember God when standing, sitting, and lying down, 
and reflect on the creation of  the heavens and earth, saying:" Lord, you have not 
created these in vain. Glory to be you! Save us from the torment of hell-fire, Lord 
(3:188-191)  in  fact by its  unity the creation shows us that the creator is one (23,
20  
( 
93:21,  22).  It equally  proves the vanity (narcissism) of the false gods, which are 
incapable of creating anything, even a fly (22, 73) 
The quran also makes use of every possible argument to affirm and reaffirm 
this oneness of God. At one point, for example,  it relates a story of Abraham who 
destroyed all family idols but one, which he accused of having broken the others. It 
is incapable  of doing that, somebody rejoins.  If it is incapable  of doing that, then 
why do you worship  it? Why do you worship an incompetent object? (21 :52-70). 
Moreover, the creation reminds man of the mercy of God who frees him and 
supplies his needs. It also shows the power of God, which is adept of giving life and 
thus restoring it on the day when he raises the dead. God is the lord of the universe; 
this truth is carved in the hart of humankinds and they have no excuse to deny it. 
(Q, 7,172) 
God calls men to worship only Him, and reminds them that He who creates 
them and those before them.  And before that, he made the earth as a place to live 
and rest. He also made the sky as a structure and sends down rain from the sky. The 
rain brings water for the plants to grow and for the animal to live. All of this, God 
provides for us as a signal of His mercy and His compassionate for human being. 
He reminds us only worship Him. This is a duty for us and it is worthy to note that 
the worship has nothing to with God's glory, whether men worship Him or not, He is 
already full of Glory. He is the Greatest (Akbar). He does not need us to glorify 
Him.  In fact,  it is we, as Human being needs to worship Him. Why, it is  very 
natural that a man always seeks for a model to be worshipped;  it  is  embedded 
within their soul. 
In the primitive era, men worship big trees, big rivers, big mountains, and big 
jungles, because, they needed it. The fear and the hope always occupied his mind, 
and he expected by worshiping something stronger and more powerful than them it 
would bring something good in life. In medieval times, people looked for a King to 
worship, because He had the power to determine the life  and the death of his 
people, and, for that cause, they call the King a lord and they begged for his mercy. 
During the renaissance Era, man began to worship reason and thought that the 
reason is powerful enough to increase the quality of human lives, and subsequently,
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
began to separate God from public affairs. Now  in the modem  and postmodern 
decades, people worshipped another God technology and industry. They believed in 
this era we did not need God to fulfill human needs. Technology can fulfill all of 
human needs. 
It seemed true that they did not need God anymore; however, they replaced 
 
Him  with  another  God  that  always  was  in  human  lives.  They  always  need 
something over themselves and they worship it. That is why the quranic message 
still  applies  even  today  and  will  until  the  end  of the world.  Men  always  need 
something to worship whether  he confess it or not.   Moreover, the best  One to 
worship is the One and the Only God Allah Taala, because everything will perish 
but His.  So, it is better to worship the eternal one not the perish one. 
Therefore, He tells us repeatedly not to set up partner, equals to Allah. Some 
western scholars and even Arab scholars like Ibn Warraq accused Allah as a Selfish 
God, an authoritarian God, since He commands people only to worship Him. This is a 
very wrong accusation.  Some people perceived that the concept one God is sent 
down just for the sake of Allah, for His glory, for the sake his own name. In fact, in 
contrast  to  what  they  think,  the  concept  of tauhid  (oneness  of God)  has  been 
revealed  since  Adam  until  Muhammad  saw  for  the  salvation  of human  soul. 
Imagine, How tired our soul would be if we had to worship, to serve so many Gods 
with so many requests.  It is  like having so many bosses or supervisors who watch 
us, evaluate us, and give us various tasks to fulfill. Then we are not freedom, and 
our soul will suffer because we have to please many bosses/gods. 
Therefore,  it is  very safe to conclude that the concept of tauhid  (oneness  of 
God) aims to liberate human soul and to give them so much freedom that they will 
never have it in the rest of their lives, if they take other Gods beside ALLAH. 
 
                                                 B. The Relationship between God will and Human freedom
 
Humans  are,  according  to the Islamic perspective,  created  in "the  image  of 
 
God"  and  are  also  God's  vicegerents  (khalifah)  on earth.  But,  they  are  both  by 
virtue of their servitude  to God which makes it possible  for them  to receive  from
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heaven and to administer on earth.  By  virtue of their  centrality  in the  cosmic 
scheme,  proven  in  reverse,   if proof is  necessary for  the skeptic,   by the  nearly 
complete destruction  they have brought upon the environment,  they participate  in 
the divine freedom,  and by virtue of being early  creatures they are beset by all the 
limitations that a lower degree  of existence implies.  God is both pure freedom and 
pure necessity.  Man as the theophany of the Divine names and qualities, or as the 
'image  of God" participates in both freedom and this necessity. Personal freedom 
 
lies, in fact, in surrendering to the Divine will and in purifying oneself to an ever- 
greater degree inwardly  so as to become liberated from all external conditions, 
including those of the carnal soul (nafs), which press upon and limit one's freedom. 
Pure freedom belongs to God alone; therefore the more we are, the more we 
are free.  In addition,  this intensity  in the mode of existence cannot come, save 
through submission and conformity to the will of God, who alone is in the absolute 
sense. There is no freedom possible through flight from and rebellion against the 
Principle, which is the ontological source of human existence and which determines 
ourselves from on high. To rebel against our own ontological Principle in the name 
of freedom is to become enslaved to an ever-greater degree in the world of the spirit 
for the indefinitely extended labyrinth of the psychophysical world where the only 
freedom  is to pursue an ever more accelerated life of action devoid of meaning and 
end. 
 
Infinity resides in the center of our being, a center that is hidden from the vast 
majority of those who live on the periphery of the wheel of existence. Yet, only at 
the center are we free in an absolute and infinite manner.  Otherwise, each of us is 
limited  in  both our powers and rights vis-a-vis  God, nature, and other human 
beings. To seek infinity in the finite is the most dangerous of illusion, a chimera that 
cannot but result in the destruction of the finite itself.  'Infinite freedom' exist only 
in  the  proximity of  the  infinite.  At all lower  levels  of  existence, freedom is 
                                     conditioned by the limitations  of cosmic existence itself and is meaningful only
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 with respect to the  limitations  and obligations that the  very structure  of reality 
 
i
.
mposes upon us. 
I
 
 
In Islamic  theologian  perspective,  the discourse of human  freedom  mostly 
debated  among   the  famous  schools.  The  Ash'arite  negates  human   freedom 
(ikhtiyar) completely in favor of a determinism (jabr) that is all-embracing. Other 
theological school, such as the Mu'tazilite  and most of the Shi'ite,  do believe in 
human freedom and reject the total determinism of the Ash'arites.  Altogether, the 
debate concerning free will and determinism is a central one to Kalam, and nearly 
theologian has participated in it. The debates are in many ways the reverse of what is  
seen today  among  philosophers;  some  seek to  safeguard  the  free  will  of the 
individual  in  one  form  or  another  of materialistic  'determinism  whether  it  be 
biological, behavioral,  or something else, and others try to defend these forms of 
determinism.  Among Muslim theologians there has been, of course, no question of 
an  outward  "material"   factor  determining  human  freedom.  The  problem  is the 
relationship  of human  will to the Divine Will and the extent to which the latter 
determines the former. 
Asharite tends toward a totalitarian voluntarism not usually seen in Christian 
theology, but there are many other views among Muslims.  It is also important to 
remember that despite all the debates among theologians, men did and do continue to  
live with a consciousness  of their free will and hence responsibility  before God. As 
the remarkable  dynamism  of Islamic history proves, the Muslims  are not at all fatalist  
they  are  made  out  to be  in western  sources. But  their  reliance  upon  the Divine 
Will and awareness of the operation of that will shown in their incessant use of the 
term insha Allah   (If God wills) in daily discourse is more noticeable  than in most  
other  cultures.  The  debates  of the  theologian  reflect  this  general  religious concern  
for  submission   to  the  divine  Will  and  conformity   to  its  injunctions, 
although   the   shortcomings    of  all   rational   theologies   in   overcoming   certain 
dichotomies  and polarizations,  which the theological debate  of the subject created, 
pushed certain  hardened  positions  to extremes  and went  so far as to deny human 
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 freedom against both the immediate  experience of man and religious injunctions 
concerning man being held responsible before God for their actions. 
As far as the realization of freedom in Islamic civilization is concerned, it too 
must be studies on several levels, especially those of an action and thought as well 
as the actual possibility of attaining inner freedom and deliverance. On the level of 
external action, the immediate question that arises is that of political freedom vis-a- 
vis  forms of government that  from Umayyad period onward,  did  not  have a 
completely religious character and were supported  by nearly unlimited  military 
power.  Much has been written about "Oriental despotism" and the lack of freedom 
• of men in the face of the state. However,  it must be remembered that for ages the 
divine law remained as a protective code worse whose bound even most ruthless 
 
ruler could not transgress. There remained  within Islamic society  a continuous 
tension between  the  political  authority  of the  caliph,  sultan,  or  amir  and the 
religious scholars (ulama) who played a major role in protecting the shariah and 
therefore, those freedoms of the individual guaranteed by the shariah. 
Early Islamic history the issue of God's political dominion was elevated by 
khawarij  when they rebelled against the fourth Khalif Ali ib Abi Tahlib and also to 
his opponent Muawiyah. Initally the supporters of Ali, the Haruriyya turned against 
him when he agreed to arbitrate his political  dispute with a competing political 
faction, which was led by Muawiya. 
Ali himself agred to the arbitration on the pre-requirement that the arbitrators 
be bound by the quran and give full consideration to the supremacy of the shari'a. 
But the Khawarij  believed that God's law clearly supported Ali, so they rejected 
arbitration as inherenly unlawful and, in effect, a challenge to God's sovereignty. 
They  condemned   Ali   for  his  willing  to  compromise  God's   supremacy  by 
transferring decision making to human agency. Then, they summoned Ali a traitor 
to God, and after efforts to reach a peaceful resolution failed, they killed him. After 
which, Muawiya seized  power and established himself as the  first leader of the 
Umayyad Dynasty. 
The  argument  of Khawarij  related  to  God's  sovereignty  is  relied  on  the 
quranic  verse "Allah the only judge"  (La hukma ilia Allah). But considering the 
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 historical   context,  the  Khawarij's   sloganeering  was  initially   a  call  for  the 
symbolism  of legality  and the supremacy  of law  that  later  descended into  an 
unequivocal  radicalized demand for fixed lines of demarcation between what is 
lawful and unlawful. 
To a believer, God is all-powerful and the ultimate owner of the heavens and 
earth. But when it comes to the laws in a political system, argument claiming that 
God is the sole legislator endorse a fatal fiction that is indefensible from the point of 
view of Islamic theology. Such arguments pretend that some human agents have 
perfect  access to God's  will, and that human beings could become the perfect 
executors of the  divine will without inserting  their own human judgments and 
inclination in the process. 
Moreover, claims about God's sovereignty assume that the divine legislative 
will seeks to regulate all human interactions, that sharia is complete moral code that 
prescribe for every eventually. But perhaps God does not seek to regulate all human 
affairs,  and  instead  leaves  human  beings  considerable  latitude   (freedom)  in 
regulating their own affairs as long  as they observe certain minimal standard of 
moral condut, including the preservation and promotion of human dignity and well- 
being. In the quranic discourse, God commanded creation to honor human beings 
because of the miracle of the human intellect-an expression of the abilities of the 
divine. Arguably, the fact that God honored the miracle of human  intellect and 
human being as a symbol of divinity is sufficient to justify a moral commitment to 
protecting and preserving the integrity and dignity of that symbol of divinity. But- 
and  this  is  Ali's  central  point-God's  sovereignty  provides  no  escape  from the 
burden of human agency.(Khaled;9) 
The idea of human  freedom is  well elaboratd by Muhammad  Abduh who 
distinguished  between  two  sorts  of man's  actions:  a.  an  act  which  is  done in 
emergency (by Coercion or unwillingly) and; b. an act which man can choose to do 
or  not,  i.e.  acts  initiated  by man with his  knowing  and  willing  without  being 
compelled by a necessity. Man's freedom of action does not mean that he can do 
what Allah does not like. Thus a free act accords with Allah's will. Yet ye will not, 
until Allah willeth". This indicates that man is granted a limited realm within which 
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he may exercise his ability of choice, and this extends also according to the capacity 
of his knowledge. 
Since man is given this advantage he is entitled to use it. He is then rewards 
by Allah for his good deeds and punished for his wrong. 
The matter of reckoning (reward and punishment) is considered by al-Qadi al- 
Jabbar as a just (fair) price which man deserves in correspondence with the freedom 
that is entitled to and in  the way he uses it.  The human mind is considered by 
Muhammad Rashid Ridha as a guide by which man distinguishes between right and 
wrong.  This guidance (reason) is granted by Allah because He wishes us to avoid 
wrong.  Moreover,  he has sent  messengers to  show the way for man and to 
compensate for weaknesses of the human mind.           -� 
 
The relativity  of freedom of man is  confirmed  as well as by the modem 
thinker such as Rifaat al-Tahtawi who says freedom in the sense of a permission to 
a lawful act without an unlawful obstacle or a prohibited obstruction, is divided into 
four categories; natural freedom, freedom of conduct, freedom of religion, political 
freedom. 
2
 
 
According to Muslim jurist acts are originally allowed unless a restriction is 
raised to bind that permission or prohibit an act. 
Hence the principle of personal liability is evidenced by some Muslim Jurists 
to prove the freedom of people.  They say  that principle is  confirmed by all 
religions. Because people enjoy a certain extent of freedom then they may be held 
responsible for their acts. There may be no place for responsibility'  in the absence 
of freedom. Moreover, alQuran indicates that man is created to be vicegerent on the 
earth.  Such a great responsibility entitles man to enjoy  certain  capacities (mind, 
freedom, will power, etc). Consequently, man's practicing freedom in performing 
his duty is  understood to be subject to Allah's will. Nonetheless, it is not exactly 
Allah's willing but it is in the capacity of his own willing. 
Therefore, Islamic  legislation  undertakes to  preserve human dignity as  a 
fundamental principle, especially in the realization of rights and freedom for all 
 
2     
al-Arwi,    Mafhum   al-Hurriya (Casablanca:   al-Markaz   al-Thaqafi   al- 
Arabi, 1981 ),49 
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mankind, and in disregard of their race or belief. Moreover, the individual freedom 
is regulated  so as not to conflict with other's opportunity to enjoy human honour 
likewise. 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Human Dignity 
 
Al-Alusi said:  "everyone and all members  of the human race, including the 
pious and the sinner, are endowed with dignity, nobility and honour, which cannot 
                                     be exclusively expounded and identified. lbn Abbas, has commented that God Most
 
High has honoured mankind by endowing him with the faculty of reason. 3 
 
Mustafa al-Siba'l and Hasan al-'Ili have similarly remarked that dignity is a 
proven right of every human being regardless of colour, race or religion.4  Ahmad 
Yusri has drawn the conclusion that 'dignity is established for every human being 
as of the moment of birth. Huquq al-Insan wa Asbab al-Unf fi'l Mujtama'  allslami 
fi Daw' Ahkam al-shariah, Alexandria: Mansha'at al-Maarif, 1993, p.30. 
Sayyid qutb stated dignity is the natural right of every individual. The children 
of Adam have been honoured not for their personal attributes or status in society, 
but for the fact that they are human beings. 'Dignity is therefore the a absolute right 
of everyone'. 5 
Al-Zuhaili  said  'dignity  is the natural right (haqq tabi'i)  of  every human 
being.  Islam  has upheld it as such and made it a principle of government and a 
••                    criterion of interaction among people.  It is not permissible to violate the personal 
 
dignity of anyone, regardless of whether the person is pious or of ill-refute, Muslim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  Mahmud  al-Alusi,  Ruh al-Maani fl tafsir al-Quran al-Azim, Beirut: Dar al- 
Turats al-Arabi, n.d.,v.xv, p.117 
 
"Mustafa  al-Siba'I  and Hasan al-'Ili,  M.S,  Ishtirakiyat  al-Islam,  2nd  edn, 
Damascus,  al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah  lil Tiba'ah wa alnashr,  1960, 66;  Abd alhakim 
Hasan al-Ili, al-Hurriyat al-Ammah, Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, 1983, 361 
 
5   
.Sayyid  Qutb,  Al-Ada/ah  al-ljtimaiyyah fl I-Islam,  ed.4, Cairo:  Isa  Babi 
                                            alHalabi, 1954,59.
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or non-Muslim. Even a criminal is entitled to dignified treatment. For punishment is 
meant to be retribution and reform, not indignity and humiliation. 
6
 
alGhazali   says:'   we  would  like   to  see   that  our  relations with  other 
communities are founded on this kind of latitude (alsamahah). This is because we 
believe that Islam commands us to have good and peaceful relations with those who 
are not aggressive toward us.7 
 
Weeramanty observes that the quran makes dignity intrinsic to the personality 
of every individual  so that 'no regime, however powerful, could take it a way from 
him.  This inherent human dignity also provides the basis of modern doctrines of 
human rights.
8  
"He had showered His choicest blessings, could not be subject to a 
violation of that dignity by man.9                                                    ;. 
The quran confirms that man's creation was a unique act of creation.  It was 
distinguished from God's  creation of the rest of the heavens and the earth in that 
these were created by God's will and command,  whereas man's creation was an 
expression of divine love. This is manifested, as the quran confirms, in God's direct 
involvement in the creation of man. Man is depicted as God's handiwork, whom He 
designed in the best image and form, and then breathed into him of his own spirit. 
God's love for mankind is also manifested in His command to the angles, and lblis, 
to prostrate themselves before Adam. Prostration is a supreme act of humility and 
devotion, something that God would normally reserve for Himself. God's direct 
involvement also signifies the intimacy and closeness of the God-man relationship, 
which did not cease with the first act of creation but continues to be expressed and 
unfolded as a reality through the religious experiences of the believers. 
Since religion is the matrix of the God-man relationship,  it is founded, in the 
case of Islam, on divine love, mercy and grace. The rituals of the faith, the prayer 
 
 
6 
Wahbah  al-Zuhaili,  al-fiqh al-lslami Wa adillatuhu,  ed.3, v.6. Damaskus:Dar 
al-Fikr, 1989, 720. 
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Muhammad alGhazali,  Huquq al-lnsan  bayn  Taalim  al-Islam  wa J'lan 
alUmam al-Muttahidah, Dar alDakwah lil nashr waltawzi'  1993, 37 
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and supplication, when engaged in with sincerity, are expressive of man's devotion 
to and love for God, which is, as God taught His beloved servants to feel, without 
intermediaries. This is witnessed by the fact that Islam does not have a church or a 
clergy that  mediates between God and man,  and  no  one  exercises spiritual 
mediation of any kind in Islam. A Muslim relates directly to his Creator, at any time 
and any place. 
It is a manifestation  of the dignity of man that Islam has placed an infinite 
 
..                                             value on human life. This is expresses in the quran in the following terms: 
We ordained for the children of Israel that if anyone a slew a person, unless it 
 
was for murder or of spreading mischief in the land, it would be as if he slew the 
whole of mankind. And if anyone saved a life, it would. be as if he saved the whole 
of mankind (Q: al-Maidah: 32). 
The reference to the children of Israel,  that  is,  the Jews, represents the 
continuity of the basic values that are common to all revealed religions.  Both 
Judaism and islam  are committed to the protection of human life.  It makes no 
difference whether the victim is a jew, a Muslim or anyone else.  The value that is 
advocated is holistic and indivisible in that aggression against one is tantamount to 
aggression against all. Life is not only of infinite value, it is also sacred; Nor take 
life, which God has made sacred, except for a just cause' (al-Isra':33) 
Al-Ghazali: in respect to the sanctity of life and the prohibition of aggression 
against it, Muslims and non-Muslims are equal. An attack on the personal safety of 
•                         non-Muslims appeals to the same punishment in this world and the hereafter. 
 
In times of military engagement. Combatants have a personal responsibility 
not to  destroy civilian life.  It  is  consequently unlawful to attack women and 
children,  the  elderly and  the  insane,  the  ill  and  the  invalids. The  exempted 
categories  also include  the priest and the monk and those engaged in worship, as 
'         well as farmers who occupy themselves with their works in the field provided that 
they are not involved in the conflict. 
 
 
 
I                      D. The Fundamental Human Rights 
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The term interest, al-maslaha may refer to either an essential or a minor matter 
of human concern.  In this regard the expression al-maslaha al-rnutabara is used by 
Muslim  jurist  to  identify   a  basic  interest   of man.   Therefore,  the  law   in  · ts 
safeguarding of men'  interests, observes the priority, or the graduated importance of 
each interest to be protected.  Accordingly interest of rights are classified into three 
preferences as follows: 
1. al-usul al-khamsa, the five fundamental (necessities) 
 
These five elements are considered to be the prior goal to be maintained by 
the  Islamic  law,  viz.  the  legal  human  purposes  of the  law,  and  which  are also 
confirmed by the previous divine religions . 
b. The religion:  Religion is  given careful consideration  by all Muslim jurists 
and it is considered  as the  summit  of the  five elements  because  it is  the divine 
framework  within which man's  life,  rights and moralities  are processed.  It is  not 
only concerned with worshipping, but it is also a legal system which protects all of 
human  concerns,  which  may  not  be  secured  without  a  safe  and  a perfect  legal 
system (religion). Hence it  is the basis for the best life  and therefore  it  safeguards 
itself in addition  to maintaining its extraneous purposes. In modem terms it may be 
called the public order of a community. 
Accordingly, protecting the rights to freedom of belief and thought is a part of 
religion's role  in maintaining  itself.  Moreover,  it is a realization  of the religious 
purpose for which the religious system is  established.  In other words, this rights is 
an essential feature in the divine aim to perfect man. 
In these terms the Islamic philosophy  of the right to freedom of religion  and 
the reason for which jihad was regulated may be more understandable  and clear. 
b.  Individual  soul  (alnafs):  the  legal  principle  of protecting  a  soul    is  so 
comprehensive  that  it includes  the  right  to  life,  safety  of man's body,  livehood, 
medication  and whatever  may be necessary  for his existence  or to defend himself 
from whatsoever  may threaten his life and his dignity, in addition to the right of free 
movement and residence . 
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c. Mind (al'aql); security of mind constitutes a dual function: it confirms  the 
safety of man's body because his mind is part of his body, moreover it protects his 
right to belief or thought, for his mind is the inds of his intellectual development. 
d. procreation (al-nasl): 
 
This right as well may be considered multipurposed. Thus it includes social 
rights such as enjoying a family life, the right to marriage and to procreate and the 
right of children to enjoy  their lives  with their parents.  In addition the right to 
existence of human races, particularly of minorities is protected. 
e. Property (al-mal): The protection of property implies comprehensively  the 
 
• right of people to obtain property and their right to protect it: economic  rights and 
the right to work are covered by this protection. 
 
The above five elements are the primary interests. These are highly esteemed 
and held sacred by the law so that  everybody should be able to enjoy them as his 
essential rights, and as primary elements which are attached to man's life on earth. 
Furthermore, to make life easier, agreeable, and meaningful, two other categories of 
interest are considered to be maintained as follows. 
2. al-Hawaij or alhajjiya al-asliya, the fundamental Needs. 
 
According to some muslim jurist,  al-hajjiyat  are the interest without which 
difficulty is caused for peole in achieving are the interest without which difficulty is 
caused for people in achieving the five fundamental (necessities),  that is they are 
assistant means to the element of people's enjoyment of their fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, they are protective elements of those rights even though they are 
themselves a range of rights for people. 
For instance, legal exemption such as the permission given to a sick person to 
break hism fast during his sickness. This is a relief of his legal burden and a sort of 
precautionary measure to maintain his life . 
• 
3. The right to common Benefit and Luxury. 
•  The facilitating means which improve individual  or public conditions are 
called  alumur  altahsiniyya.   Comparing  these  elements  with  the  two  above 
categories,these  latter  one (al-tahsinat)  are not essential. They are the secondary 
elements for the luxury of life, so that the life becomes more enjoyable.
32  
According to al-Shatibi, they are advantages additional to the necessity and 
the utilities. Nevertheless, the lack of luxurious should not constitute any 
diminishment of either of the tW-0 basic group. Moreover, it may be added that as a 
matter of fact, man according to his capacity, does not normally forego the basic 
livelihood.  He tries his best to develop it to better level  above that which is mere 
necessity. 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Concept of Islam and Jihad 
 
• 
Referring to the Quran,  the term Islam in the sense of surrenderto the only 
 
God,  implies  not  only the  mission  of Muhammad  (Saw), but  also  the  previous 
divine  religions  which  were  also based  on the  unity  of one  God.  These  would 
include  the  missions  of  Abraham,  Moses  and  Jesus  (pbut),  Consequently,  the 
followers of those religions were known as Muslims, that is submitters, those who 
accordingly, surrendered to the Creator and accepted those missions. 
Nonetheless, according to this view, those religion were later called Judaism, 
or Christianity imply the specification of each mission with its own messenger as a 
sort of historical categorization. 
All the previous heavenly religions and Islam are based on one and the same 
principle which is the unity of the one God i.e. Allah. They are all originated from 
the same divine resource. Thus they are His Messages to His people as guidance for 
them. 
 
So it is safe to say that there would no be conflict between  those  religions. 
Furthermore,  each previous  religion is given to the development  of human  society 
as  such time  to  be  grasped  by people.  In this  regard  the  prophet  Muhammad's 
mission was to complete the previous prophetic missions. 
•                             Accordingly,  it is intelligible that Islam regards itself as a developed  part and 
a final  stage  of  the  general  religious  framework  started  by  the  earliest  Prophet 
•                                Adam and completed by Muhammad.  So, it is indisputable  logically that a part of a
 perfect thing will not contradict the whole body of that thing but is is always  in 
harmony with that body. 
Islam  was revealed  gradually to  following messengers, step  by  step  in 
response to the development made by succeeding of men until Muhammad's time. 
He then,  received the final fulfilling part of  the Islamic  doctrine and for all 
mankind. Whosoever followed any of God's prophet in his own time was a Muslim, 
because he had accepted a specific Islamic stage. But, Islam as given to Muhammad 
is the final stage which should be accepted by all human beings willingly. 
All the above religions are highly respected by Islam because Islam considers 
itself to be part of a unity of progressing belief. Islam also recognize other religion 
such as Shabean and Majusi. Therefore, no one shouldhave been forced accept any 
of God's  religion.  If a belief is  imposed  on a man it  will not gain his true 
acceptance. He will conceal his real response. Consequently the aims and purpose 
of the religion cannot be realized by a community of those who do not really accept 
the religion even though they may feign acceptance. 
Jihad is a peaceful method of inviting people to the religion.  This has been 
conducted in similar way by earlier Prophet, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. 
Moreover,  all religions generally and most effectively spread peacefully among 
people, by their free consent. 
But when some people are not satisfied with simply making a peaceful refusal 
and they attempt to fight a new thought or belief,  then they are violating other's 
rights and freedom. 
Jihad against  persons who chooses to fight,  may be considered as being 
against a certain regime, but not its people. Therefore, a Muslim army does not fight 
the non-combatant among that people. Rather it releases them from an sort of tenets 
which may be ideologically imposed on them by that regime.  That is  to say,  it 
protects their freedom of belief and gives them the opportunity to embrace Islam 
freely if they wish, even though in the sight of Islam they must accept God's final 
revelation. This duty is considered something between people and God, which is to 
say that they are responsible before God, not before Muslims. 
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 Muslims do not have to intervene by forcing Islam to others.  Thus their duty 
is  only to introduce it to non-Muslims and to fight any person who prevent this 
conveyance. 
If Muslims defeat non-Muslims in a battle or campaign, then the latter party 
 
has to chose whether to pay jizya,  or to embrace Islam and thus become like any 
other Muslims in respect of duties and rights.Therefore, it may be concluded that 
jihad  in  its military sense is  a hateful means for realizing peace, for protecting a 
right or abolishing an evil, but under any circumstances it may not imply hostility or 
injustice. Thus God's law is absolutely free from any material purposes. 
•                                             The criteria that guide the Islamic state are: 
a.    There is no compulsion in religion.:.''Q.2:256. 
 
b.   Allah enjoin  justice  and kindness ... and  forbid  lewdness  and 
abomination and wickedness .. 16:90 
c.   0 you who believe fulfill your undertakings (covenants),Q.5:1 
 
 
 
So, jihad  is a defensive means which is imposed religiously  on Muslims to 
protect their natural rights, such as freedom of religion or defending themselves and 
their homes against an alien threat. The practice of jihad involves justice, kindness 
and humanity.  For it is not to uproot a certain group of people, but is only to stop 
their aggression. 
Islamic  international  relations  are  based  on  the  maintenance   of  peaceful 
.. relations. Therefore,  covenants and treaties are considered very important and to be 
observed by Muslims.  Moreover, treaties constitute an additional  source of Islamic 
international law. 
 
 
 
 
• 
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 Chapter III 
 
The Classical Islamic law on Human Rights 
 
 
 
A. Basic Principles on Human Rights 
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• 
The jurisprudence is  concerned with the codification of Islamic 
law, and their discussion of freedom is naturally from a juridical point of 
view  rather  than  a  metaphysical one.  Nevertheless,  the  metaphysical 
background is present in their juridical  discussions, for they are dealing 
with  the  same  homo lslamicus  to  who  of the  whole  of the  Islamic 
revelation  is   addressed.   The  jurisprudents ·., envisage  human  freedom 
because of personal surrender to the Divine Will rather than as an innate 
personal right. For them since we are created by God and have no power 
to create anything by ourselves (in the sense of creation ex nihilo), we are 
ontologically dependent on God and therefore can only receive what is 
given to us by the source of own being. 
Human rights are, according to sharia, a consequence of human 
obligations  and  not  their  antecedent.  We  possess  certain  obligations 
toward God, nature, and other humans, all of which are delineated by the 
shariah.  As a result of fulfilling these obligations, we gain certain rights 
and freedoms that are again outlined by the divine law. Those who do not 
fulfill  these  obligations have  no  legitimate  rights,  and  any  claims  of 
freedom that they make upon the environment or society  is illegitimate 
and a usurpation of what does not belong to them, in the same way that 
those persons who effuse to recognize their theomorphic nature and act 
accordingly are only "accidentally'  human and are usurping the human 
state which by definition implies centrality and divine vicegerency. Islam 
holds this conception not only for its own followers but also for all other 
religions that, therefore, as religious minorities are given rights under their 
own religious codes . 
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 Islam's  perception  of  human  rights  is   not  premised  on  the 
individual versus nation-state framework.  The nation-state itself represent a 
superimposition which has little claim to authenticity in the authoritative 
sources of Islam.  The quran and sunnah lend support to the creation of a 
political order and leadership that takes charge of community affairs and 
administers justice. However, the main actor and audience in all this is the 
individual, not the state.  The Quran also address the individual and the 
community of believers when it speaks of the duty of hisbah, that is, the 
'promotion of good and prevention of evil'  (amr bi'l ma'ruf wa nahy an al 
 
• munkar).  The  community   of  believers,  the  ummah,   is   consistently 
addressed in the quran as 'o  you who believe'  that is the plurality of 
 
individual  believers, not a separate  or corporate body of its  own.  The 
individual  is required  to obey the ulu al-amr, that is, persons who are 
entrusted with leadership but whoa re accountable to the community. The 
whole conception of Islamic political organization and the state is service 
oriented and humanitarian  in the  sense  that the  individual  remains the 
principal  actor in all its part. The state as a corporate entity is not the 
primary actor, nor is it the repository of supreme political authority. The 
ummah or the community of believers is the locus of political authority, 
which is  often described as a form of executive sovereignty. This is a 
delegated  sovereignty  that  is  founded  in  the  quranic  doctrine  of the 
vicegerency of man on earth, that is, the khilafah. It is by virtue of this 
derived,  or  delegated,  sovereignty  that  the  community  is  seen  as the 
repository of political power. 
Islam has  devised a unitary  system  of  law  and  government in 
 
which ultimate sovereignty belongs only to God. Both the individual and 
• 
the state are subject to the same law and their basic rights and duties are 
 
predetermined by the sharia. The objective of justice, promotion of benefit 
 
(maslahah) and prevention of corruption and harm (mafsadah)  are to be 
• pursued by both, and the state has no authority to overrule or replace the 
sharia, or to violate any of its principles. Thus, duality of interest between 
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 the individual  and state envisaged in the modern theory of human rights 
does not present a dominant source of concern for the Muslims jurists. The 
jurist and ulama did not proceed on the assumption that the interest of the 
individual and state were potentially in conflict. The view has prevailed 
instead  that Islam assumes a basic harmony between the individual and 
state, which  is  to be realized through the implementation  of the sharia. 
This is a consequence partly of the quranic doctrine of unicity (tauhid), 
which has  profoundly  influenced Islamic thought  and institution.  When 
the state succeeds in enforcing the sharia,  it satisfies the basic purpose of 
its existence.  Since individual  and state are expected to subscribe to the 
same set of values, and the state exists in order to administer justice, no 
necessary conflict is assumed to exist between the rights of the individual 
and the state power. 
A similar scenario can be visualized with regard to modern 
constitutional  law, which resembles the theory of human rights in that both 
are predicated  on the duality of interest between the individual  and stat  . 
Constitutionalism   as  a  phenomenon   emerged   and  developed   on  the 
assumption  that  the  nation-state  presented  a menace  to  the  rights  and. 
liberties of the citizens.  These rights were potentially in conflict with state 
power  and  it  relentless  drive  to  control  the  lives  and  activities  of its 
citizens.   Constitutional   law  was  then   developed   in  the   west  as  an 
instrument  for  regulating  this  conflict.   More  recently,   however,  this 
perception   of   duality   in  the   fabric   of   constitutional    law  has  been 
•                                              questioned  and there has been  growing recognition  of the view that the 
 
state is a potential ally and protector of civil rights and liberties. This shift 
in the underlying  perception of constitutional  law would,  in tum, seem to 
require  parallel  changes  in  the theory  and practice  of constitution  in the 
• nation-states    as  they   stand,   something   which   has   evidently   not   yet 
materialized   and  which  present  a  fresh  challenge  for  future  reform  of 
 
•                                                    constitutional law . 
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Islam's   perception   of   leadership   and   political   power   that 
administers the affairs of the community is inherently individualist in the 
sense that leaders are committer to serve the best interest of the individual. 
The state is under duty to protect the five essential interest (i.e. daruriyat 
al-khamsah), namely faith, life, property, intellect and lineage, through the 
establishment  of a just  political  order  and  government.  The  quran has 
proclaimed  human  dignity  an  inherent  right  of  the  individual  in  an 
absolute and unqualified sense, as discussed below, and this then provides a 
matrix for the rest oi'his'basic rights. 
When human rights are seen as manifestation of respect for human 
dignity,  human rights  are  likely to have  a more  authentic  basis  across 
cultural  traditions.  As  one  commentator  noted,  nothing  could  be  more 
important than to underscore and defend the dignity of the human person.
1
 
 
To  take dignity  as the  goal and purpose  of human  rights  would  be to 
enrich the caliber and substance of these rights. 
Islam's perception of human rights is rooted in human dignity and 
 
it is, at the same time, intertwined with human obligations. Obligation is a 
primary concept, indeed the focus of the sharia, and it often takes priority 
over  right.  Indeed,  it  is  through  the   acceptance   and  fulfillment   of 
obligations that individuals acquire certain rights. Dignity thus becomes a 
reality when there is a balanced emphasis on rights and obligations. 
World cultures and traditions tend to differ not only in the value- 
 
content   of  human   rights   but   concerning   many   other   variables   that 
• influence  the place and priority that is given to those rights. The western 
tradition posits freedom in order mainly to avoid the outcome of a deposit 
system  of  government,   while  Islam  emphasizes   individual   rights  and 
interests,  while Islam gives priority to collective  good in the event where 
 
the latter conflicts with the interest of the individual. Having said this, the 
 
 
 
• 
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individual  remains the primary  agent and focus of  attention in Islamic 
 
law.' 
 
 
 
B. Status of non-Muslims  in relation to Muslims 
 
 
 
There is general agreement among Muslim scholars that Islam 
recognizes equality in the essential dignity of human beings, but there is 
disagreement about whether Islam guarantees equality before the law to 
alike. Mutawali has thus observed that complete equality before the law is not 
the norm in the shariah. Despite the variable meanings of equality in 
different periods of history and in different cultural settings, if one takes 
equality before the law in the sense in which it now features in the 
constitutions  of many Muslim  countries,  it evidently  does  not  admit it 
accept slavery, or the superiority of men over women.  Mutawalli has thus 
recorded  one of the two opposing  views outlined  above that, the sharia 
recognizes these distinctions. The legal status of zimmis and non-Muslims is 
not equal to that of Muslim citizens, slavery is permitted, and women do not 
enjoy equal rights. This last point has been further elaborated by him in  that 
the sharia permits a Muslim male to marry a Jewish  or Christian 
woman, but the marriage of Muslim woman to a non-Muslim  man is not 
permitted. 
Two  quranic  verses  have  been  quoted  by  the  advocates  of  this 
 
view,  namely  Ali  Imran:   110  and  Tawbah:  29.  Two  basic  conclusions 
• have  been  drawn  from  these  passages.  First,  Muslims  are  superior  to 
members  of all other  religious  groups,  as they  are designated  'the best 
community.'  Second,  Christians  and Jews  who have  not  accepted  Islam 
should be conquered,  brought  down and subjected  to the payment  of the 
.. 
 
 
 
•  
2
(Hasim Kamali, The Dignity of Man, An Islamic Perspective(Cambridge: 
The Islamic Texts Society, 2002, p.xi)
  
 
 
 
 
tribute (jizyah),  The advocate of this view has also referred to another 
verse of al-Maidah: 51. 
3
 
The distinction between Muslim and non-Muslims reflected in the 
juristic view of the schools on several issues such as retaliation in cases of 
homicide when the victim  is a non-Muslim,  and the testimony of non- 
Muslims before the sharia court. 
In the  areas of crime  and punishment,  including just  retaliation 
(qisas), blood  money (diyyah)  in unintentional  homicide,  or diyyah for 
personal injuries, the most preferred position is that the sharia does not 
differentiate between Muslim and non-Muslims. 
However, the majority  of jurist  in the leading schools have held 
that a Muslim may not be killed for killing a dhimmi, and have referred in 
support of this view to a hadith where it is stated, and have referred in 
support of this view to a hadith where it is stated that 'a  Muslim is not 
killed  for  killing  an unbeliever.'(  Abu  Dawud,  sunan,  vi,  328.)  Imam 
Malik and the shiah Imamiyah held that a Muslim is retaliated for killing a 
dhimmi  if the killing is  with the purpose  of taking  his property  and in 
cases where the killer is a habitual criminal. This view also refers to cases 
that were accordingly disposed in this way during the time of the Caliph 
Umar and Uthman, but many have disputed the accuracy and detail of the 
reports concerning them. 
The Hanafi rulings tends to have a greater harmony with Quranic 
provision  on justice,  and specially the verse that provides that God does 
not forbid you from being good and just to those who have not waged war 
against you over your religion'  (al-Mumtahinah,60:80). 
To be just to the followers of other faiths must mean giving those 
equal rights and protection  in all respects. This is also the essence of the 
covenant  (dhimmah)  that  the  Muslim  state  has  offered  them,  and  the 
Prophet  clearly  entitled  them  to  equal  rights.  As  for  the  hadith  that  a 
 
 
 
3   
(Mutawalli, Abd al-Hamid, Mabadi Nizam alllukm fi'l lslam (Alexandria 
(Egypt): Mansha'at al-ma'arif,  1974, 391. 
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• 
Muslim is not killed for a kafir, Imam Abu Hanifah has interpreted this by 
saying that kafir here means a harbi that is the belligerent non-Muslim 
who is not protected under the covenant of dhimmah.
4  
The jurist have also 
differed  on the diyyah (blood money) of a  dhimmi in  unintentional 
homicide (qatl  al-khata'),  which is  payable to the next of kin of the 
deceased. There are three views on this, one of which is that the diyyah of 
a dhimmi  is half that of a Muslim. This is the view of Imam Malik and the 
caliph Umar ibn abd. Aziz.
5
 
 
The second view quantifies the diyyah of a dhimmi at one third 
that of Muslim. This view held by Imam Shafi'i. is attributed to the Caliph 
Umar and uthman, and number ulama among.the followers (tabi'un). The 
third view has it that the diyyah of a Muslim and non-Muslim  is the same, 
and this is  held by the Imam Abu hanifah and Sufyan  al-Thawri.  lbn 
Rushd, who has recorded these views, considers the Hanafi position to be 
preferable, and he  cites the  following quranic ayah  in  support  (al- 
Nisa' ,4:92).  This ruling applies equally to Muslims and to those who are 
in a treaty of alliance with them. Abu hanifah has also referred to a hadith 
in  its support,  related on the authority of al-zuhri, in which the Prophet 
said that 'the  diyyah of a Jew, a Christian and every dhimmi is like the 
diyyah of a Muslim.' 
This is also having been the practice of the four Caliphs until the 
first Umayyad Caliph Muawiyah,  who began to pay half to the public 
treasury (bayt mal) and the other half to the relatives of the deceased. Then 
the caliph Umar ibn Abd. Aziz passed judgment in favor of the reduced 
diyyah, but he stopped payment to the public treasury and only made one- 
half of the diyah of a non-Muslim payable to the heirs of the deceased, 
Thus it  is  safe to say that the quantitative change in  the diyyah of non- 
 
 
 
 
 
"al-Kasani, bada'I al-Sana'I, Cairo: Matba'at al-istiqamah, 1956, vii, 237. 
 
5  
Muhammad  ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd alQurtubi, bidayat al-Mujtahid wa nihayat 
al-Muqtasid, Cairo: Mustafa al-babi al-halabi,  1981,11,310. 
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Muslims represents a later  development that does not find support in the 
sources .
6
 
Relevant Islamic international concepts are identified as follows: 
 
a.  dar alharb:  a non-Muslim country which is fighting or threatening the 
 
Islamic state; dar al-Islam. 
 
b.dar al-sulh :    a non-Muslim  nation which has peaceful relations 
with Islamic state. 
c. dar al-harb: a non-Muslim citizen of dar-alharb 
 
d.  Foreigners (alien): non-Muslim  people who live temporarily in 
an Islamic  state,  for trading  or  any  other  business.  They  may become 
citizensif their applications are accepted by the Islamic authorities.  Aliens 
consist of two categories; a.  al-Musta'manun:  people of dar al-harb, who 
entered the Islamic state according  to her permission  (visa).b. People of 
dar al-muwadaa:  this category does  not need the entry visa because the 
treaty  of peace  or  established  relations  between  their  country  and the 
Islamic state entitle them to enter. 
e. ahl dar-Islam:  citizenry of the Islamic state also consists of two 
categories: a. Muslims, b. non-Muslims,  ahl al-dzimmi. 
The  general  principle  is  that  this  group  of the  Islamic  state's 
citizens are equal in their rights and duties with muslim citizens, but they 
are exempted  from some duties which  religiously can be applied only to 
Muslims.  According  to the principle  of freedom of religion  approved by 
Islam, dhimmi for instance do not have to render military  service, even if 
•                                               their lands or districts are attacked by a foreign power. Thus it is Muslims' 
duty  to  protect  them  (dhimmis)   and  their  property.  Dhimmi  political, 
social, religious  rights, their freedom  of thought  and their  right to social 
• 
security, etc, are secured similar to any normal Muslim citizen. 
Non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic state are given important 
consideration  in  Islamic   law.   Moreover,   the  Muslim   caliphs  used  to 
..                                                                                 
instruct their successors to take care of them (dhimmis) . 
 
 
 
6 
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 C. Women and Children's rights 
 
Once most women were humiliated, enslaved and passed from man 
by inheritance or purchase, not only in Arabia but perhaps everywhere in 
the world. Some Arabs buried newborn girls alive, for fear of poverty and 
disgrace. 
Then,   Islam   promotes equality   between girls  and  boys  by 
instructing the parents to treat their children alike. Early Islamic history 
witnessed that women occupied various social, political and legal position. 
They exercised their rights so that the balance between theirs and men's 
rights was restored. That is to say, that since each man and women is half 
of the community, then the function of each of them is complementary to 
the other. 
The main quranic principle here is that women have equal rights 
with men. But, concerning the family's affairs, men are given a degree of 
greater authority. That may be taken to indicate a necessary authority to 
enable man to perform his legal  duty as a guardian and an economic 
provider for the family.  That is to say, the law entitles him authority 
commensurate with to the responsibility which is placed on him for the 
purpose of managing his family. In this he is not given freedom to behave 
whatever he pleases, rather he is in charge  of performing legal  duties. 
Accordingly, the relationship  between man and his wife is based on the 
principle of legal and moral justice. This is expressed by the holy quran as 
kindness.  In  case where man abuses his authority, the law establishes 
necessary measures against him. 
1.  Woman has a right of maintenance from male  agnate. This is 
due to a. A valid marriage contract; b. She performs her marital duties and 
c.  If she is  not married, her father is responsible for maintaining her. In 
case the father is  incapable or ceased, the responsibility is  undertaken by 
her other male kin or by public treasury. 
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 2. Women under Islamic law is not part of her husband's 
personality,  a fact which entitles her the right to keep her own family 
name whether she is married or not, that is on the same standing as a man. 
Accordingly three implications  are drawn   from that  principle, a.  the 
economic and civil rights which entitle a women the legal competence to 
have her own property, to invest her wealth and to be a party in business 
contract;  b. Her right to  inherit from her husband; c. Her right to be 
satisfied sexually by her husband, just as she would satisfy him. 
3.  Woman's  right to have education has  been  undisputable in 
 
Islamic history. The Prophet himself always points Aisha to be consulted
 
for her knowledge in religious matters. 
· �
 
4. Woman's right to dignity, honor, and purity is highly esteemed 
by sharia. According to the Islamic concept of dignity, a woman's right to 
honor is formulated in a practical framework of regulations. Those 
regulations as also precautionary measure to protect her against any 
suspicion  that might detract from her honour.  In other words,  it  is to 
secure  her  purity  fro  the  abuse of  some  vicious  people.  The  above 
purposes of the law are approved by both the holly quran and the sunna, 
particularly by their  regulations concerning the decent dressing of women 
and that they should keep distance from men who are strangers to them, 
unless it is otherwise necessary. The same regulations also applied to men. 
5.Woman  has right to work so as she may respond to either her 
 
financial necessity or to satisfy the need of the Muslim community for 
• 
female workers, particularly in educational and medical fields. 
 
6. Most jurist uphold that the supreme leader or the head of state 
 
• 
should be male. They consider the capability of a Muslim ruler to take part 
in  Jihad  is  one of the pivotal conditions qualifying  him to possess the 
 
presidential office. They consider a Muslim caliph as the supreme army 
leader as well as political leader.  And since women are exempted from 
performing of jihad  then they lack the important condition  of the  state 
headship. Women are not qualified to be the supreme ruler. 
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Referring to Islamic restriction concerning a woman's dressing and 
her avoidance of male community, some other scholars  add that in the 
case that she is a ruler, she will not be able to stay far from strange men, 
that is,  she has to deal mostly with them and such involvement is  not 
permitted by the law. That opinion extends to include the judicial office as 
well. Abu Hanifa,  however,  allows a woman to be a judge  in certain 
condition, while al-Tabari reasons that because a woman has the right to 
make a legal opinion, she should have the right to be a judge. 
A woman's right to be member of parliament is rejected, 
nevertheless they participated in al-bay'a (election), in the sense of voting 
or electing the supreme ruler:  a fact which may be extended to include 
their voting in  parliamentary or presidential  elections and in rejecting 
certain decisions of the government. 
A divorce women has   a prior right of having her child in her 
custody. In the case she is not capable or is dead, then a certain level of 
maternal, female relative is preferred as the child's custodian rather than 
those of the same level of paternal relationship. This is because y. unger 
children's welfare is realized more by being with their capable mothers. 
According to Muslim jurists, a child remains in the custody of the 
mother until he or she is  7-9 years old.  The reason is that majority  of 
jurists do not specify a fixed age in which the child is transferred to the 
father's custody, is that not all children attain discretion in the s     e age, 
namely, discretion is considered the criterion by which a child is entitled 
• 
to the option of chosing either of his or her competent parents. Proceeding 
 
from the child's welfare, the above option does not exist  in a case of 
disability of one of the parents. The child is kept in  the custody of the 
other parent. A mentally incapable child also does not enjoy  the option. 
Such a child is kept in the custody of his or her mother. In this concern, al- 
Shafi'I considers the child as if he or she is under seven years because of 
•                                                          
the lack of discretion. 
 
In this connection also, the legal restriction for woman based on; 
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 a.  The law  exempts a woman from seeking a livelihood because 
physically she performs a greater function; she gives birth to her baby and 
feeds it with the sap  of life,  a fact which cost her suffering and pain. 
Therefore her legitimate maintenance is levied on man. Accordingly, he is 
assessed financially by a double share of his kin's inheritance while she is 
given a single  share  in  general,  but without any financial  obligation. 
Moreover, she wins the priority of custody of her child. 
b.  A woman is  exempted from jihad because she  share in it by 
producing brave fighters who defend the nation.  Likewise,  it  may be 
• understood  that a non Muslim woman is not obliged to pay al-jizya tax 
because she is the producer of tax-payer men:  That is because that tax is 
paid in lieu of fighting. 
c. Comparing  the above two points with the grave responsibilities 
of governing, judging and representing people in parliament, it may be 
argued that those responsibilities  are not privileges.  The women are 
exempted from a duty such as maintenance of jihad.  Then logically it is 
their right to be exempted from the heavier burden of governing or 
judging, etc. 
4.  It  is  also  justified that those legal  restrictions are not for 
underestimating a  woman.  They are  rather a  sort  of  distribution of 
provinces between people, so  that a  certain  distributed role  is  more 
suitable to a particular person, concerning  his or her natural capacity of 
sex.  Then it  could be said  that the law  is  more reasonable and fair. 
Namely, even people of the same sex have different functions according to 
their various capabilities.  Therefore it would be wise to put a suitable 
person is a suitable job. Accordingly, it may be understood that a woman's 
• 
responsibilities should be less than a man's, because he is not capable, 
 
naturally to undertake her function of procreation etc. 
 
It may be concluded that the above justifications are more suitable 
• 
to the Islamic  social structure of community. From modem views those 
restrictions    are considered as a sort  of  deprivation of  women rights. 
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However,  it  may be  said  that those  are the  areas  in  which  there  is  a 
different  perceptual  understanding  and they  are  not  comparable  to  the 
modem ones. 
Islam  guarantees  the  right  of child  to  live  since  the  stage  of 
embryo.  An embryo's  right to life is strictly protected.  So,  abortion  is 
illegal and any sort of miscarriage which may caused by another person is 
punishable. A pregnant woman should never be punished for the crime she 
committed until a reasonable time after she delivered her baby so that the 
baby's life is safe and she has recovered her normal health. 
• 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• 
 
 
 
• 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• 
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 CHAPTER IV THEORIES OF 
ISLAMIC  LAW 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Determining Rights of Man 
 
According  to  the  Universal  Islamic  Declaration  of human  rights,  al-haqq 
(right) is defined as an opposite or correlative of duty that is, a person's rights is 
another's duty. This is to say that rights of people are government's  duties Abdul 
Razaq al-Sanhury states that al-haqq is an interest  which is protected by the law; 
while Ahmad F. Abu Sinna indicates that it is something which is established by the 
law fro man or for God, vis-s-vis another person. 
Accordingly, it can be understood that anything which is not prohibited by the 
law may constitute  a right.  Things, that is,  are permitted  unless  a prohibition  is 
raised.  That  permission  may be understood  as people's liberty,  namely  they  are 
entitled   to  exercise   it  or  not,  according  to  their   desires,   needs   or  interest. 
Consequently,  their  exercise  is  sanctioned  by  the  law  so that  their  enjoying  or 
benefiting  from that exercise  them a privilege which  is again  safeguarded  by the 
law. Therefore,  it may be deduced that a law may be guardian  even if it does not 
legislate certain areas of human concerns. 
A right is divided by Muslim jurist into three categories: 
 
1. Allah's rights 
 
This  group  of rights  is  public  rights  for  all  and  it  is  called  (haqqu  allah) 
because it is considered most important. There fore, the doctrinal provision  which is 
applied  by  law,  legal  alms,  giving,  and  managing  the  public  wealth   by  public 
authority,  although  they  realize  public  interest,  are  called  Allah's  rights.  Hence 
• 
people have no option to choose whether they perform a public legal duty (right) or 
 
not; they are obliged to fulfill it. They will otherwise threaten the public interest so 
that the law has to react, taking sanction against them.  Haqq Allah is  an obligatory 
•                                    matter on individuals for the public welfare. 
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 2. Joint right 
 
This is a right which is common between Allah and man. In this concern, Al- 
Mawardi considers that a guardian's  failure to fulfill his duty toward a foundling 
who is under his care is  a breach of joint right. 
Some  other  early  and  contemporary  jurist  point  out  that     a  slanderous 
allegation of the crime of unchastity, alqadhf, when it is committed by someone, 
constitute a violation of the above right,  so that it threatens both a public interest 
and a private one. That is, it defames a person and creates an atmosphere of mistrust 
among family and community members. Therefore, the slandered person can not 
forgive the criminal person because the degree of the public interest violated here is 
more than the private one. 
Nonetheless, when such a violation takes place in a joint right which consists 
of larger private portion and a smaller public one, i.e. it is more private than being 
public, then the victim is entitled to waive his right ifhe wishes. A murder crime for 
instance, although it threatens the public security, it concerns even more one's life 
i.e.  a   private  right.  Consequently,  this  entitles the  victims  relatives  to  demand 
retaliation, compensation or forgiveness. 
3. Private right 
 
This category of rights is the pure right of a person regarding his property and 
it  is his absolute right to demand or to waive it, unless another right is harmed by 
this  procedure.  Accordingly  it may be deduced  that  right  is a material  or moral 
interest which is recognized and protected by the law. 
Perhaps the most intriguing  discourse on the subject in the juristic  tradition 
concerns  the  rights  of God  and the  rights  of people.  The  rights  of God  (huquq 
Allah) are  rights  retained  by  God  in  the  sense that  only  God  can  say  how the 
violation of these rights may be punished and only God has the right to forgive such 
• 
violation.  These rights are subject to the exclusiveness jurisdiction  and dominion of 
God, and human beings have no choice but to follow the explicit and detailed rules 
that God set out for handling  acts that fall within God's jurisdiction.  However, all 
•                                        rights not explicitly retained by God are retained by people. And while violations of 
 
God's  rights  are  forgiven  only  by God through  adequate  acts  of  repentance,  the 
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 rights of people may be forgiven only by the people. Thus, according to the juristic 
tradition, a right to compensation is retained individually by a human being and 
may be forgiven only by the aggrieved individual. Neither the government nor God 
has the right to forgive or compromise such right of compensation if it is designated 
as part of the rights of human beings. 
Most of the discourse taken by jurists occurs in the context of addressing 
personal monetary and property rights, but they have not been extended to other 
civil rights, such as the right to due process or the right to listen, reflect, and study, 
which may not be violated by the government under any circumstances. This is not 
• because the range of people's rights was narrow-quite the contrary; it is because 
the range of these rights was too broad.  It should be recalled that people retain any 
rights not explicitly reserved by God.  Effectively,  since the rights retained by God 
are quite narrow, the rights accruing to the benefit of people are numerous. The 
juristic practice has tended to focus on narrow legal claims that may be addressed 
through the processes of law  rather than broad theoretical categories that were 
perceived as nonjusticiable before a court. As such, the jurist tended to focus on 
tangible property rights for compensation instead of moral claims. Therefore, for 
instance, if one person burns another person's books, the aggrieved part may seek 
compensation for the destruction of the property but cannot bring an action for 
injunctive relief preventing the burning of the books in the first place. Despite this 
limitation,  the juristic  tradition, in fact, develop a notion of individual claims that 
are immune from government or social limitation or alienation. 
Muslim jurist also asserted the rather surprising position that if the rights of 
God and of people overlap, in most cases, the rights of people should prevail. The 
justification for this was that human need their rights and need to vindicate those 
rights on earth.  God, By contrast, asserts God'  rights only for the benefit of human 
beings, and, in  all cases,  God vindicate His rights in the  Hereafter  if need be. 
However, Muslim jurists  did not imagine  a set of unwavering and  generalizable 
rights for each individual  at all time. Rather, they thought of individual  rights as 
• 
arising from a legal cause brought about by the suffering of a legal wrong.  A  erson 
 
does not possess a right until he or she has been wronged and obtains a claim for 
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retribution or  compensation as  a  result.  To  shift  paradigms  would  require  a 
transformation of traditional  conceptions of rights,  so  that  rights  become the 
property of individual holders, regardless of whether there is a legal cause of action. 
The set of rights recognized as immutable are those that are necessary to achieve a 
just society while promoting the element of mercy.  These must be the rights that 
guarantee the physical safety and moral dignity of every human being. It is quite 
possible that the relevant individual rights are the five values, but this issue needs to be 
reanalyzed in light of the current diversity of human existence. The fact that rights 
of people take priority over the rights of God, on this earth, necessarily mean that a 
claimed right of God may not be used to violate the rights of human beings. God is  
capable of vindicating whichever rights God wishes to vindicate in the hereafter.   
On  this  earth,  we  concern  ourselves  only  with   discovering  and establishing 
the rights that are needed to enable human beings to achieve a just life while, to the 
extent possible, honoring the asserted rights of God. In this context, the commitment 
to human rights does not signify a lack of commitment to God or a lack willingness 
to obey God, but is instead a necessary part of celebrating human diversity, honoring 
God's vicegerents, achieving mercy and pursuing the ultimate goal ofjustice. 
In the  second half of the last century, Muslims have made the unfounded 
assumption that Islamic law is concerned primarily with duties, not rights, and that 
Islamic  conception  of rights  is  collectivist not  individualist.  Both  assumption, 
however, are based only on cultural suppositions about the non-Western "other". It 
is as if these interpreters fixed on a judeo-Christian or perhaps Western conception 
of rights and assumed that Islam must be different. 
In reality, Claims about both individual and collective rights are largely 
anachronistic.  Premodem  jurists  did not assert a collectivist  vision  of rights or 
individualist vision.  They did speak of alhaqq-al'amm  (public rights)  and often 
asserted that public rights ought to be given precedence over private entitlements. 
However, this amounted to no more than an assertion that many should not be made 
to suffer for the entitlement of the few. For example, as a legal maxim, this was 
utilized to justify the notion of public takings or the right to public easement over 
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private property. This principle was also utilized in prohibiting unqualified doctors 
from participating medicine. However, Muslim Jurist did not justify the killing or 
torture of individuals  in order to promote the welfare  of the  sate or the public 
interest. 
The notion of individual rights is actually easier to justify  in Islam than a 
collectivist orientation.  God created human beings as individuals, and their liability in  
the  hereafter   is  individually  determined  as  well.   To  commit   oneself  to 
safeguarding and protecting the wellbeing of individuals is to take God's  creation 
seriously. Each  individual  embodies a virtual universe  of divine  miracles. Why 
should a Muslim commit to the rights and well-being  of a fellow human being? 
The answer is that God already made such a commitment  when God invested so 
much of the God-self in each and every person. This is why the quran asserts that 
whoever kills a fellow human being unjustly has in effect murdered all of humanity; it 
is as if the killer has murdered all of humanity; it is as if the killer has murdered the 
divine sanctity and defiled the very meaning of divinity (5:32). 
Moreover, the quran does not differentiate between the sanctity of a Muslim 
and that of a non-Muslim.  The measure of moral virtue on this earth is a person's 
proximity to divinity through justice, and not a religious label. The measure in the 
Hereafter is a different matter. However, that matter is God's exclusive jurisdiction. 
God will most certainly vindicate God's  rights in the hereafter  in the fashion that 
God deems most fitting. However, our primary moral responsibility  on earth is the 
vindication  of the rights of human beings.  A commitment  in favor of human rights 
is a commitment in favor's of God's creation and, ultimately, a favor of God.
1
 
 
B. Equality among citizens regardless religion 
 
The fiqh discourse on dhimmis must be viewed as the responses to the period 
where Islam was politically being superior.  Nowadays, Muslims  should be back to 
the broad principle  of the sharia, as Mahmud Saltut noted that sharia endorses the 
equality of all people in respect of the right to life. No one's blood is more precious 
than  anyone  else's  is,  and  the  law  does  not  recognize  any  distinction  between 
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 people in this regard.  Shaltut adds that different of opinion among jurists are known 
to exist on the subject cf diyyah  and retaliation (qisas), not only with reference to 
non-Muslims but also with regard to certain other categories of individuals, such as 
father and son, master and slave, and even man and women. However, these are, as 
he put it, 'matters of personal understanding concerning only the fuqaha who have 
expressed  the  views  in   question  and  not  necessarily  a  statement   of  general 
principles of  the  shariah' .
2   
Shaltut  further  comments  that  the  fuqaha  may have 
 
deduced these exceptional rules by bearing in mind the prevailing circumstances of 
their times. They are often in agreement on basic principles but tend to vary in other 
respects: with reference to the same subjects, that is, blood-money and retaliation, it 
may be noted that fuqaha are all in agreement on the criminal responsibility of the 
perpetrator in crimes of violence, regardless of the religion of the victim, but they 
differ in their approach to the determination of punishment. 
Abd alQadr Awdah has looked into some of these scholastic differences  and 
reached the conclusion that the Hanafi position, which subscribes to equality among 
individuals  regardless  of their  religion,  is  more  acceptable  to  and  bears  more 
harmony  with  the  applied  law  of  the  present-day  in Muslim  countries,  and  is 
therefore generally considered preferable.
3  
Mawdudi has in turn drawn attention to 
 
the  point  that  shariah  does  not  differentiate,  about  the  application  of penalties, 
especially  the  prescribed  (hudud)  penalties,  between  Muslims  and  non-Muslims, 
and these penalties  are applied equally to all. Whether one talks of the punishment 
for adultery, or,  theft, or slanderous accusation, etc., no distinction  is made on the 
grounds  of  the  religious  of  the  perpetrator.  This  should  also  be  the  case  about 
•                                 
retaliation and diyah.
4
 
• 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Mahmud Shaltut, al-Islam, Aqidah wa Shariah,( Kuwait: Matabi dar alqalam, n.d. 326 
 
 
 
3 
Abd.  Qadir Awdah,  al-Tashri' al-Jina 'i, (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risalah,  1983) II, 123. 
 
 
 
4  
Sayyid  Abu A'la al-Mawdudi, Nazariyyat al-Islam al-Siyasiyyah, translated from Urdu by 
 
Khalil hasan al_slahi, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr,n.d. p.443. 
 
 
 
53
 M.  Abu  Zahrah   has  highlighted  the  egalitarian   spirit  of  this  quranic 
declaration (49:13) and observed that this verse has laid down the foundation of the 
equality of all citizens before the law without discrimination on the basis of wealth 
colour, race or religion. The only criterion of superiority that Islam accepts is moral 
excellence  (taqwa)  and righteous conductReferring to the  same verse Mahmud 
Saltut  has  observed  that  Islam  has  declared  mankind  a  single  unity  and  a 
requirement  of that unity  is  the equality of all human beings in respect of their 
rights and obligations, which is  also the only way for the establishment of justice. 
Justice,  being  the  overriding  objective   of  Islam,  cannot  be  achieved  without 
equality.
6
 
 
Mahmassani  has  also observed that  'the  brotherhood  of man  is one of the 
fundamental  postulates  of Islam, which contemplates  the whole  of mankind as a 
single nation. He stated that Islam abolished the tribalism and social discrimination 
based  on  lineage  and  nobility  of descent  that  were  so  common  in  pre-Islamic 
Arabis. Islam invited people to unite on the basis of tawhid.  The prophet endorsed 
this  Unitarian  message  and  called  for the  social  transformation  of Arab  society 
when he said unequivocally in a hadith.
7
 
 
Rashid  al-Ghanoushi  observed that Islam did not command justice  only for 
Muslims but for mankind generally, and this is perfectly clear in the Quran, where 
justice  is an obligation  that must be observed even when one is dealing with one's 
enemy. He further observed that Islam basic commitment to equality is not at all in 
doubt either  generally  or in respect of the rights and obligations  of non-Muslims. 
There are, however,  differences of detail among jurist concerning the status of non- 
.. 
Muslims, which have largely been due to differences of religious belief and it is not 
unreasonable  that some of these should be accepted. To attempt  to establish total 
 
equality among people who subscribe to different values, might amount to injustice. 
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To impose on non-Muslims,  in other words, something  that is disagreeable to their 
religions  is likely to go against the essence of equality and justice. 
8
 
Muhammad  Salam Madkur has commented that nationality and religion are 
now separate  matters, and are treated as  such  under the  prevailing laws of 
contemporary  Muslim states.  People belonging to different  religion enjoy  equal 
rights, just as they also share equally in the duties of military service and taxation. It 
would be quite reasonable to depart from the earlier criteria of religion-based 
distinctions, and treat the issue from the wider perspective of equality and justice.9 
Al-Qaradawi has distinguished two types of fraternity in Islam, namely the 
 
fraternity of man and religious fraternity, both of which are recognized in the quran. 
The believers are brethren (49: 10)  is  a clear and unequivocal affirmation  of the 
religious fraternity of Muslims. He then adds that this level of fraternity of Muslims 
is not in conflict with the wider fraternity of man, and the two should in fact be seen 
as complementary, and not contradictory, to one another. 
10
 
 
C. Women and Men Have Equal Rights 
 
Men and women are equal in Islam related to the essence of human dignity> 
reward and accountability for personal conduct, and matters pertaining to property 
rights, morality and religion. 
The quranic evidence on the fundamental equality of the sexes refers, in the 
first place, to their equality in their essential humanity. One reference to this is the 
following Q,75:37-39; 17:70. 
The progeny of Adam includes  both men and women, who are equal in th , 
 
way they are created and in their inherent dignity. The divine grace from which the. 1 
 
emanated does not discriminate between the male and the female.  The egalitarian 
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 call of  the  Quran  is confirmed in  several places,  in reference,  for  instance, to 
personal accountability and reward for good work. 
As for women's equality in matters of employment  and eligibility to public 
office, there are those who maintain that men and women are equal only in regard 
to what is known as the domain of private authority but not in respect of public 
authority. 
The hijab is a wajib (duty) in Islam. Several men were enraged because he 
suggested that veiling is not a faridah (one of the basic requirement  of Islam, the 
denial of which leads to the charge of apostasy (The Hanafi school and some jurist 
from other schools distinguish between a faridah and wajib. Most Jurists from other 
schools did not. Kamali, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence,  321,324-325.  Another 
speaker alleged that hijab is the sixth pillar of Islam (rukn), which is unprecedented 
claim in Islamic juristic  history. Particularly  among Muslims  of the Wahhabi or 
puritan orientation and Muslims in the West, it is fair to say that no single topic is 
so heavily stressed and emphasized as that of the requirement of veiling for women. 
The practice  of hijab is part of a complex  social  and political  dynamic 
particularly in Muslim societies. It is, at times, adopted as a form of affirmation of 
identity or as a from of social protest  against the dilution  of Islamic culture and 
against the Westernized secular dictatorships that rule most Muslim countries 
The  most  worrisome  aspect about this debate,  is that  hijab is virulently 
espoused  by  men,  and that these  espousals  seem  to  affirm  the  stereotype  about 
women as a seething source ofji.tnah (seduction). 
Fitnah might very well be an empirical  issue and not a legal determination. 
 
What is unduly sexually arousing and how, when, and where,  might pose difficult 
socially  based  empirical  questions.  For  instance,  if we  assume  that  there  is  a 
community   that   endures  on  a  fetish  according   to  which   veiling   women   are 
considered  particularly  seductive,  should that  mean  that  women  ought  to discard 
their  veils,  or  should  we  ignore  the  empirical  reality  in  favor  of juristically- 
constructed  reality?  Alternatively,  assume that in  a particular  desirable  by women 
and men. Should these blond men cover their hair of faces so as not to be a source 
offitnah? If the focal issue in hijab determination  is the issue offitnah, arguably in 
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 the  first  hypothetical,  the  solution   should  be  to  uncover,  and  in  the  second 
hypothetical, it ought to be to cover. 
Alternatively, one could argue that hijab is not aboutfitnah, but about awrah 
 
(the private parts that a person must cover). If the hijab is about covering the awrah 
of a woman,  and  not necessarily about fitnah, then the  empirical  issue of what 
causes or does not cause sexual enticement becomes  largely immaterial. In other 
words, the empirical question of whether, for example, the hair or arms of a woman 
cause  sexual  enticement  become  largely  irrelevant.  These  body  parts  must  be 
covered because  they are private, not because they are private,  not because they 
• sexually arouse. Most classical sources state that the issue of covering is a matter of 
awrah, but most modem discourses deal with it as a matter ofjitnah. This leaves the 
position   of   empirical   inquiries   into   realities   of  seduction   quite   ambiguous. 
Interestingly,  what becomes known in modem discourses as the hijab is discussed in  
classical juristic  sources in the chapter on prayer. In that chapter, among other 
things,  the jurists  discuss  of awrah (private  parts  that  ought  to  be  covered  by 
clothing) is discussed as well. In prayer, a Muslim man or woman must cover their 
full  awrah,  or  what  the  law  considers  to  be the  private  parts  of human  being. 
Presumably,  what  is considered to be the awrah while in prayer  also needs to be 
covered outside of prayer. This is at the heart of the debates on hijab-the hijab, in 
that sense, is whatever covers the private parts (ma yastur al-awrah). 
The quran commands Muslim men and women to lower their gaze, be modest, 
and  not  to  flash  their  adornment  (zinah) except  when  appropriate,  such as with 
husbands  or  wife.  Early  Islamic  reports  do not  tie the  issue  of what eventually 
becomes  known  as the hijab  to the problem  of fitnah, but they do tie it to social 
status and the physical safety of women. 
The  issue  of awrah is  complex  partly  because  it  is  extremely  difficult  to 
retrace  and reclaim  the  historical  process  that  produced  the  determinations  as to 
awrah. The awrah of women was a complex matter. The majority  argued that all a 
woman's  body  except the hands and face is awrah. Abu Hanifa  held that the feet 
are not awrah,  and some argued that half the arm up to the elbow or the full arm, is 
not an awrah. A minority  view that even face and hands  are awrah and therefore 
' 
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 must be covered as well. An early minority view held that the hair and calves are 
not awrah.  In addition some argued that women must cover their hair at prayer, but 
not outside the prayer. Importantly, the jurist disagreed on whether the covering of 
the awrah is a condition precedent for the validity of prayer. The majority held that 
covering the awrah is afard (basic and necessary requirement), so that the failure to 
cover the awrah would invalidate a person's prayers. The minority view (mostly but 
not exclusively,  Maliki jurists)  held that covering the  awrah is not a condition 
precedent for prayer -accordingly,  this scholar argued that covering the awrah is 
among the sunan of prayer, and that the failure to cover the awrah would not void a 
person/s prayer. A large number of Hanafi jurist argued that as long as three-fourths 
of the body is covered, the prayer is valid.
11
 
 
Six materials point related to awrah according to Khaled Abou fadel: 
12
 
 
One, early jurist disagreed on the meaning  of zinah (adornment) that women 
are commanded to cover.  Some jurist argued that it is all the body including the hair 
and face except for one eye. The majority argued that women must cover their full 
body except for the face and hands. Some jurist held that women may expose their 
feet and their  arms up to the elbow. Importantly, someone  such as Said b. Jubair 
asserted  that  revealing  the hair  is reprehensible,  but  also  stated that  the Quranic 
verses did not explicitly say anything about women's hair. 
Two,  the  jurist   frequently  repeat  that  the  veiling  verse  was  revealed  in 
response to a very specific situation. As explained above, corrupt young men would 
harass and, at times, assault women at nights as these women headed to the wild to 
relieve themselves.  Apparently,  when confronted, these men would claim that they 
did not realize  that these women were Muslim women.  Rather,  they claimed that 
they thought  that these were non-Muslim  slave girls, and therefore  not under the 
protection  of the Muslim community.  In Medinan society,  and any individual  was 
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under the protection of either a clan or, if the individual  was Muslim, he or she 
would be under the protection of Muslims. Therefore, these verses seem to address 
a very specific, and even peculiar, historical dynamic. The interaction between the 
text and the text's social context is not easily transferable  or projectable to other 
contexts. 
Three, Muslim jurist consistently argued that the laws mandating the covering 
of the  full  body  did  not  apply to  slave  girls.  In  fact,  it  is reported  that  Umar 
prohibited slave girls from imitating free women by covering their hair. Apparently, 
Muslim   jurists    channeled   the   historical   context   of  the   verses   into   legal 
determinations that promulgated a particular social stratification. However, it is not 
clear whether  the social stratification addressed by the.quran are the same as the 
stratification endorsed by the jurists. 
Four,  the  jurists  often  argued  that  what  could  be  lawfully  exposed  in  a 
 
woman's  body  was  that  would  ordinarily  appear,  according  to  custom  ('adah), 
nature (jibillah), and necessity (darurah). Relying on this,  they argued that  slave 
girls do  not  need  to  cover their  hair, face, or  arms  because  they  live  an  active 
economic life that requires mobility, and because they live an active economic life 
that  requires  mobility,  and  because  by  nature  and  custom,   slave  girls  do  not 
ordinarily cover of the law custom and functionality. Arguably, however, women in 
the  modem   age  live  an  economically   active  life  that  requires   mobility   and, 
arguably,   custom   varies  with  time  and  place.   In  other   worlds,   if  the  rules 
prescribing  veiling were mandated to deal with a specific  type of harm, and slave 
girls were exempted because of the nature of their social role and function, arguably 
•                              
this means that the rules of veiling are contingent and contextual  in nature. 
 
Five,  several  reports  state  that women  in Medina,  Muslim  or non-Muslim, 
normally  would  wear long  head covers-the cloth usually  would  be thrown  behind 
ears and shoulders.  Women also wear vests open in the front, leaving their  chests 
exposed.  Reportedly,  the practice  of exposing  the breasts  was  common  until  late 
into Islam.  Several early authorities state that quranic verse primarily  sought to have 
•                                       
women cover their chests up to the beginning of the cleavage  area.
60  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Six, there is a sharp disjunction between the veiling verses and the notion of 
seduction.  Seduction could be caused by slave girls, or could be between woman 
and man, woman and woman, or man and man. A man could be seduced by slave 
girls, and woman could be seduced by a good looking man, yet neither slave girls 
nor men are required to cover their hair or faces. Does the fact that a man might 
sexually enticing to women affect the obligations of concealment as to this man?. 
In order  to  properly  evaluate  the interpretive  enterprise  that  generated the 
juristic determination relevant to women and their role in society, it is essential to 
evaluate the history of gender dynamics in various episodes of Islam.  Focusing on 
gender dynamics  in history will permit us to understand  the motivations  behind 
determinations  related  to  gender  roles,  and  the  way .these determinations  were 
understood and practiced. For instance, there is evidence that as late as the 3rd/9th 
century,  the  meaning   and  role  of  the  veil  was  still  contested   in  Islam.  In 
wonderfully  eloquent  epistles, the Mu'tazili  scholar al-Jahiz  (d.255/869)  launches 
an attack against men who he accuses of attempting to seclude and repress women. 
Al-Jahiz claims that pre-Islamic Arabia did not seclude women from men, and that 
the practice of seclusion, in general, was unknown until the quran commanded the 
wives of the Prophet,  in particular, to adopt the hijab.  Al-Jahiz critizes the zealots 
who forbid what  God has permitted, therefore  implying  that the rule of seclusion 
should have been applied only to the wives of the prophet. aljahiz makes this point 
explicit by arguing that early Islamic authorities such as al-Husayn b. Ali, al-Shu'bi, 
Umar  b.Khatab  and  Muawiyya  did  not  forbid  speaking  or  mixing  with  women 
(Kitab al-Qiyan). To this point, al-Jahiz discussion is rather unremarkable: there are 
many jurists  who  made  this same argwnent  in Islamic  history.  Al-Jahiz polemic 
becomes interesting  when he starts talking about the attitude of some men towards 
                                        women.  Al-jahiz  strongly critizes the attitude of the Hashawiyah  towards women, 
accusing   them   of  espousing  unduly  oppressive   laws.   In  an  explicitly  critical 
passage,  alJahiz  states the following:  "we  do not  say, and any  reasonable  person 
cannot say, that  women  are above men or lower than men a degree  or two more . 
• 
But, we have  seen people  who revile (women)  the works  revilement  and disdain 
 
them and deny them most of their rights. Most certainly,  it is true impotence  for .-\
 man to be incapable of fulfilling the rights of fathers or uncle unless he disparages 
the rights of mothers and aunts.  Al-Jahiz contends that it is a misguided sense of 
male jealously  over pride and honor that accounts for the tendency to oppress 
women.  Zeal in  the protection of honor, he argues, is admirable unless it forbids 
what God has allowed.  Some have used modesty as an excuse to prohibit women 
from speaking or dealing with men.  Al-Jahiz sums up the attitude and practice of 
who he calls the transgressors with the following statement, "This is a matter where 
they have transgressed beyond the zeal for honor to the realm of bad manners and 
the lack of probity." 
At a minimum, al-Jahiz discourse indicates that gender relations were 
contested and that the implication of the hijab continued to be the subject of debate 
in the 3rd;9th century. Furthermore, evidence from later Islamic countries 
demonstrates that the role played by women in Islamic history was complex and 
multi-faceted. We find that later jurist  such  as al-Sakhawi  (d.902)  Ibn Hajr al- 
Asqalani (d.852)  and al-Suyuti (911)  has studied with a large number of women. 
Ibn Hajar studied with 53 women, al-Sakhawi studied with 46, and al-Suyuti 33. 13 
 
The public role and function of women in various Islamic periods have not 
been adequately studied.  However, it is unlikely that there would have been such a 
large number of licensed women teachers if the hijab was interpreted to mean the 
seclusion of women. As noted above, women were educated by men, and in turn 
educated men.  At the very least,  this points to the fact that the  dynamics and 
practices of the hijab continued to be complex late into Islamic history. Importantly, 
this evidence also indicates that the practice behind the idea of fitnah was not as 
dogmatic and puritanical as many contemporary Muslims seem to assume. 
Islamic law also recognizes equality of men and women as human beings but · 
does not advocate absolute equality of roles between them, especially in the family 
relationship. Article 6 of the OIC Cairo  Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
states that: 
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 Woman is equal to man in human dignity and has rights to enjoys as well as 
duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the 
right to retain her name and lineage. 
The husband is responsible for the support and welfare of the family. Mayer 
has argued that the guarantee of equality 'in human dignity'  under the OIC Cairo 
Declaration falls short of guarantee of equality to the enjoyment of all civil and 
political rights to enjoyment of all civil and political rights under the ICCPR. That 
will be true with a narrow interpretation of human dignity. Abroad interpretation of 
human dignity will, of course, imply the enjoyment of all rights incidental to human 
dignity.  The OIC Cairo  Declaration has not, in any case, been subjected to any 
judicial or quasi-judicial interpretation to ascertain the scope of its provisions. The 
HRC has however observed that:  'Equality during marriage implies that husband 
and  wife  should  participate  equally  in  responsibility and  authority within  the 
family'.  The provision in Article 6b of the OIC Cairo Declaration above seems to 
foreclose women's  rights  of equality in responsibility within  the  family under 
Islamic law. 
While the wife  is not debarred from providing support and welfare for the 
family under Islamic law, it is the husband that is legally bound to do so, as will be 
further expatiated under family rights in Article 23 below. Equality of women is 
recognized in Islam on the principle equal but not equivalent'.  Although males and 
females are regarded as equal, that may not imply equivalence or total identity in 
roles, especially within the family. Muhammad Qutb has observed that while the 
demand for equality between man and woman as human being is both natural and 
• 
reasonable, this should not extend to a transformation of roles and functions.
14  
This 
creates  instances  of differentiation  in  gender roles under Islamic  law  that  may 
amount  to  discrimination  by  the  threshold  of  international  human  rights  law. 
Although the UN annotations on the draft of article 3  on equal rights of men and 
women recorded an appreciation of the drafters that it was difficult  to share the 
 
assumption that legal  systems and tradition could be overridden,  that conditions 
which were inherent in nature and growth of families and organized societies could 
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 be immediately  changed, or that articles of faith  and religion could  be altered, 
merely by treaty legislations'.  (UN Doc.A/2929  at p.62) the HRC (Human Rights 
Committee) now seems convinced that 'in the light of the experience it has gathered 
in  its activities  over the last 20  years',  it  intends  to push through a universal 
standard  of complete  gender  equality under the  covenant aimed at changing 
traditional, cultural, and religious attitudes that subordinate women universally. 
Muslim scholars argue that Islamic law had, over fourteen centuries ago, 
addressed the problem of  gender discrimination and established the woman's 
position as dignified human being sharing equal rights with her male counterpart in 
almost all spheres of life. However due to factors such as patriarchal conservatism, 
illiteracy, and poverty, women in most parts of the Muslim world still suffer one 
form of gender discrimination or the other.  Mayer has observed that 'the  most 
extensive  conflicts between the past interpretations  of Islamic  requirements and 
international  human rights norms lie  in  the area of  women's  rights and that 
'conservative interpretations of the requirement of Islamic law'  may result in many 
disadvantages for women, especially in the enjoyment of civil and political rights.
15
 
Apart from the prohibition of  discrimination on grounds of  sex in  nearly all 
international  human right instruments,  the Convention on the elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women specifically advocates equality for women 
and prohibits all forms of discrimination against them.  It is noteworthy however 
that even Muslim countries such as Tunisia, considered today as having adopted a 
•                            most liberal approach in their interpretation of Islamic law, entered reservations to 
 
the women's Convention.
16  
The recognition and importance of family institutions 
under Islamic  law cannot be overemphasized.  However, marriage is the legitimate 
means of founding a family under Islamic law.  In that paragraphs 1,2,  and 3  of 
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 Article 23 are in  full consonant with Islamic law, they in fact re-echo important 
principles of Islamic law. 
There  are  however  some  apparent  differences  between  the  thresholds  of 
Islamic law and international human rights law regarding equality of rights and 
responsibilities of spouses during marriage and its dissolution under Article 23 (4). 
Similar provision is found in Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
..  The first important issue  in this regard is the presumed concept of superiority 
of the male over the female in Islamic law.  'Abd al IAti has observed that almost all 
 
writers  have  variously  interpreted  the  following  Quranic  verses  to  mean  the 
superiority of men (husband) over women (wives) in Islamic law: 
I addressing this question, Ibn Qudamah in his highly esteemed legal treatise, 
al-Mughni,  began by indicating  the complementary  role of the two  genders, but 
went on to state that the husband's rights were greater than the wife's because God 
says that men have a degree above them'. 
The idea of superiority of men over women is inferred from the 'degree'  that 
men are stated to have above women in the Quran 2:228. But what is meant by this 
degree,  a  degree  of what?  One  observes  that  both  classical  and  contemporary 
interprets  of the 'degree'  is found for instance,   Yusuf Ali who says," ..men have a 
degree (of advantage) over them'. Men have a degree (of responsibility)  over them. 
The  parenthesizing  of the  phrases  'of advantage'  and  'of responsibility'  by the 
respective  interpreters  indicate that those are not express statements  of the Quran 
but the understanding  of the content by the interpreters.  Abd al-Ati has therefore 
pointed out that such interpretations  are 'probably  better understood  as a reflection 
of certain psychological  dispositions  or of the actual status of women,  which has 
been  low on the whole,  at least on the  surface', and that the  'idea that  men  are 
superior to women and have power over them without reciprocity  or qualifications 
stemmed  from  sources  apparently  alien  to  the  spirit  as well  as  the  letter  of  the 
quranic verse. 
17
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 It  is  noteworthy  that  both  quran  2:228;  4:34  revolve  around  the  family 
institution.  Rather than advocating the superiority of one gender above the other, 
the verse must be understood  in the context of the Islamic appreciation of role 
differentiation  within  the  family.  From  sociological  perspective,  authority  and 
power are necessary elements of any group structure. The family structure is not an 
'exception.   Bernard  quoting  all  port,  pointed  out  that  the  concepts  of  status, 
authority, power, etc, run through all human and animal relationships', and that 'the 
social psychologist sees ascendance submission or dominance-compliance wherever 
two persons  are in contact  with each other.
18  
This explains why Islam required 
leadership in every group activity to ensure cohesion in human relationships. For 
instance  in  acts of worship  involving two or more people together, Islam instruct 
that one of them must be selected as leader of the group. In all these situations the 
 
leader is not considered as being superior to the others, it is only to ensure cohesion in 
the group. To enhance the success of the family  life therefore, there arises the need 
to differentiate and  identify roles  within  the family structure.  The husband would 
necessarily be more influential  in certain roles while the wife would be in others. 
Zeldich has pointed out that in most societies the instrumental and protective roles are 
played by the husband-father,  while the wife-mother plays the expressive roles. It is 
in  exceptional  cases that the wife-mother  assumes  the protective  role within the 
family structure. That perhaps explains the degree of responsibility  that men have 
above women and which is consistent with Q,4: 34. 
The word interpreted  here as protectors and maintainers  (qawwamun) is also 
 
sometimes  translated  as 'guardians'  which  in that case involves  some  element  of 
authority on the part of the husband.  However the role of a guardian,  protector  or 
maintainer is substantially rather that of responsibility than of authority. It would be 
more  consistent  therefore  to  understand  the  degree  that  men  are  stated  to  have 
above women in Q,2:228 as degree of responsibility.  It is clear that neither the two 
verses  under examination  nor any other verse  of the Quran  mentions  specifically 
those men are superior  to women. It is also not mentioned  directly  that  men have 
absolute authority over women. 
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Where the husband/father adequately discharges of responsibility placed upon 
him, some reflective rights will reciprocally ensue to him from the wife/mother in 
the family relationship. Thus the authority of the male is at best inferred only as a 
consequence of the structural role of the husband/father in the family. Authority and 
leadership  is thus not really generalized or attached per se to the idea of the male 
being superior to the female. It relates to specific roles in the family structures and 
is  delegated  to  the  gender  better  suited  for that  role  within  Islamic  teachings. 
Whether men are better suited for that role than women is an open question subject 
to diverse cultural arguments. 
Marriage and the family institution  are very strong traditions  of Islam that 
cannot be  neglected  except  for valid  necessities.  Islamic  law  does  not  promote 
celibacy and also generally prohibits sexual relations outside wedlock. The Prophet 
is reported to have said that marriage is part of his Tradition which should not be 
neglected. Esposito has thus pointed out that: 
Islam considers marriage, which is an important safeguard for chastity, to be 
incumbent   on  every  Muslim  man  and  woman  unless  they  are  physically   or 
financially unable to lead conjugal life.
19
 
 
Muslim jurist therefore tend to protect the family institution resolutely and are 
cautions  in accommodating  any norms that would tend to disrupt that tradition  of 
Islam. To urge to protect the family institution while guaranteeing  equality of the 
spouses is not peculiar to Islamic law. Allude 
Based on quran 2:22land 60:10 there is consensus among both sunni and shi'i 
jurists  that  a Muslim  woman  is prohibited  under  Islamic  law from marrying  any 
non-Muslim  man.  Conversely, Quran 5:5  permits Muslim men to marry 'women  of 
the  people  of the  book'  (Christian  and  Jewish  women).  In  international  human 
rights law this will be considered discriminatory against women. 
Muslim  jurists  have  advanced  some justifications   for  this  provision  under 
 
Islamic law. The foremost being that, under Islamic law a Muslim man who marries 
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a Christian or Jewish woman has a religious obligation to honour and respect both 
Christianity and Judaism. Thus the woman's religious beliefs and rights are not in 
jeopardy through the marriage, because she would be free to maintain and practice 
.     her religion as a Christian or Jew.  Conversely, a Christian  or Jewish man who 
marries a Muslim woman is not under  such obligation  within  his own faith,  so 
allowing a Muslim woman to marry a Christian or a Jewish man may expose her 
religious beliefs and rights to jeopardy. This justification is therefore hinged mainly 
on  wanting  to  protect  the  religious  beliefs  and  rights  of Muslim  women.  Al- 
Qaradawi has thus argued that: 
... While Islam guarantees freedom of belief and practice to the Christian or 
Jewish wife of a Muslim, safeguarding her rights according to her own faith, other 
religions, such as Judaism and Christianity, do not guarantee the wife of a different 
faith freedom of belief and practice, nor do they safeguard her rights. Since this is 
the case, how can Islam take chances on the future of its daughters by giving them 
into  the hands  of people  who  neither  honor their  religion  nor  are  concerned  to 
protect their rights.?  
20
 
 
On grounds of the guarantee of freedom of thought, conscience,  and religion 
under international human rights law, it could be argued that other religions, such as 
Judaism  and  Christianity,  would  now· also  under  an  international   obligation  to 
guarantee the freedom of belief and religion to a Muslim wife and thus safeguarding 
her rights  according  to  her own  faith.  If so, will this  remove  the prohibit�on  of 
 
Muslim women  from marrying  men of the people  of the book'  Abd.  Al-Ati  has 
observed that the honor and reverence that the  Muslim must give to the faith of his 
Christian  or Jewish  counterpart  is an integral part  of the  Islamic  faith  while  the 
same 'reciprocity'  is not an integral part of either the Christian or Jewish faith. The 
required unreserved honor and reverence is a matter of faith that cannot be imposed 
by law.  For the same reason  the Muslim  male is prohibited  in Islamic  law  from 
marrying  an idolatress  because  of the psychological  factors involved.  Faith,  is the 
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most private relationship between man and God; it cannot be imposed or conferred. 
Nor is it the question of discrimination between men and women in Islam.21 
However, the juristic view of some contemporary Muslim jurists is that since 
Muslim women  are prohibited  completely  from marrying  non-Muslim  men,  the 
Muslim men would also be temporarily  prohibited from marrying women of the 
people of the book'  in a situation where there is apprehension of a high number of 
Muslim women remaining unmarried, until the situation is remedied. This is based 
,.                                              on the doctrine of public welfare (maslahah) under Islamic law.
22
 
 
Muslims  scholars  and jurist  have  advanced  reasons  such  as  demographic 
needs, economic factors, barrenness of the wife, chronic illness of the wife, higher 
sexual needs of men, etc., in their attempt to justify the conditional permissibility of 
polygamy in Islamic law. Most of these justifications may be stiffly contested in the 
lights of present  day circumstances.  Problems like the barrenness  of the wife are 
however  quite  tenacious   in  the   arguments   for  the  justification   of  condition 
polygamy in Islamic law.  Similar arguments are for the justification  of conditional 
polygamy  in  Islamic  law.  Similar  arguments  exist  also  in  other  cultures.  In 
traditional African society for instance, procreation is usually the main purpose of 
marriage.  Thus  where  the  wife  is  found  barren,  the husband  is usually  inclined 
towards taking another wife, even though he does not divorce his barren wife. The 
obvious  question  here  is, what  of when  the  man  is the  one  barren?  It  is  often 
assumed albeit wrongly, amongst the local populace in many developing  countries, 
that the fault for lack of conception in marriage is always with the wife. Islamic law 
however  recognizes  defects  of the husband  such as impotence,  lack of semen  or 
ejaculation during  intercourse,  lack of testicles and amputated  sexual organ, all of 
which constitute  grounds  on which  the wife seek dissolution  of the marriage.  al- 
Zayla'i,  the twelfth  century  Hanafi,  that is to say, satisfaction  of sexual urge  and 
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 procreation of children, the wife has rights to demand for dissolution.
23  
Thus, the 
woman may seek dissolution  where the man is  found barren.  The question then 
would be, why a right to dissolution for the woman and not a right to polyandry like 
her male counterpart? The medieval Islamic jurist, Ibn Qayyim has responded with 
a list of socio-legal  arguments  to this question, the most compelling  perhaps of 
which is that polyandry can easily lead to family and societal disintegration because 
both the concepts of legitimacy of offspring and family lineage would be impaired. 
There would be always be a contest for legitimacy between the male spouses each 
time a child is born in a polyandrous union, which is not the case in a polygamous 
marriage. 
24
 
 
In case of a barren woman it is often argued that totake a second wife is better 
than  either  divorcing  the  barren  wife  or having  offspring  outside  the  marriage 
through adulterous  relationships  with other women. For such exceptional  reasons, 
some Muslim  scholars have argued that 'Islam permitted polygamy -as  a remedy 
for some social diseases- under certain conditions without which plurality of wives 
shall   be   prohibited...   (because)   Islam,   since   the   very   beginning,    favours 
monogamy. Abd.al-Ati says, polygamy should not be regarded plainly as a blessing 
for one sex and a curse for the other, but 'as  a legitimate alternative  applicable to 
some difficult, "crisis" situations. 
The permissibility  of polygamy  in  Islamic law is based  on Q: 4:3, Men are 
thus  allowed  to  have  a  maximum  of four  wives  at  a  time.  Both  classical  and 
contemporary  Muslim jurists generally agree that the ability to treat co wives justly, is 
a perquisite to this permissibility  of polygamy. Imam Shafi'i did not consider the 
requirement  for doing justice  between co-wives  as an essential  legal  requirement 
but only as a 'moral  exhortation binding on the husband's conscience.  Many 
contemporary  Islamic  scholars  and jurist  however  hold the mere  apprehension  of 
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not  being  able  to  deal justly  between  co-wives  removes  the  permissibility  of 
polygamy  and  advocates  monogamy.  They  refer  to  the  concluding  sentence  of 
Q.4:3, .. .is  nearer  to   prevent  you  from  doing  injustice',   and   conclude  that 
monogamy is the rule while polygamy is only an exception. 
The  view  that  the  ability to  deal justly  between  co-wives  is  a legal pre- 
requisite to polygamy had been further argued by other  scholars and taken together 
with Quran 4:129, which says 'You will. .. " to reach a conclusion that polygamy is 
actually prohibited under Islamic law.  Advocates of that view argue that the quran 
itself confirms the inability of men to fulfill the prerequisite of dealing justly with 
co-wives. However, that view was and still strongly opposed by Muslims scholars 
who  support  the  traditional  interpretation  that  permits  polygamy  provided  that 
justice   is  ensured  between  co-wives,  since  the  prophet   and  his  companions 
exemplified for having many wives.  Therefore, it is relied upon by some Muslims 
States either to restrict or to abrogate polygamy. Ibn Qayyim stated that polygamy 
in Islam is no more and no less than that of a permissible  act, like any other act 
lawful in principle,  it becomes forbidden if it involves unlawful  things or leads to 
unlawful consequences such as  injustice. It is arguable on the above ground that the 
permissibility could be controlled under Islamic law for reasons of maslahah. 
 
 
 
D. Freedom of Religion, Opinion and Expression 
 
It is interesting to note that Islam through quranic verse guarantee the freedom 
of having religion.   However, during the Caliph Abu Bakar, there was a policy that 
whoever  changes  his  or  her  religion,  should  be  punished  to  death.  So, we  will 
discuss both perspective  and will come up with some conclusion. 
Here,  we  do  not  focus  our  discussion  of  freedom   from  theological   and 
spiritual perspective rather we focus on legal discourse. 
The verse  of the quran states that "there  is no compulsion  in religion".  The 
reader must decide  on the meaning of the text. Arguably,  this verse means that no 
one should be forced to become a Muslim. Alternatively,  this verse could mean that 
• 
while one may be forced to become Muslim, one could not be compelled  to believe. 
 
The  verse  also  means  that  one  may not  be  forced  to  pray,  fast,  or  wear jilbab. 
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 Possibly, the  verse  also  means that  one  may  not  be  punished  for  apostasy. 
Furthermore, one might argue that since there is no compulsion in religion, there 
should be no compulsion as to anything else.  Therefore, one may conclude that 
contracts entered into under compulsion are invalid. 
25
 
 
For apostasy to attract the death penalty, many Islamic scholars now denies it 
in the context of sedition or treason against the State, and not merely as apostasy 
simpliciter. 
The interpretation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
to include freedom to change one's religion or even to adopt atheistic views has not 
been without controversy among Islamic scholars in relation to the question of 
apostasy under Islamic law. 
Elaborating on the principle of non-compulsion of religion under Islamic law, 
Ismail  Faruqi had emphasized that by the wording of the quran every human is 
endowed with the capacity to know God if the intellect is exercised with candidness 
and integrity. 
The Muslim is obliged by his faith, which he believes to be the only true, to 
present its  claims  to humanity not dogmatically nor by coercion but rationally 
through intellectual persuasion, wise argument, and fair preaching. The quran points 
out that whoever accepts it does so for his own good and whoever rejects it does so 
at his own loss and none may be compelled. To advocate thought or religion by 
coercion is to tamper with the process of intellectual and constitute a threat to man's 
integrity and authenticity and is null and void from the stand point of the shariah.
26
 
 
Although the  Islamic state has a duty to promote the religion of Islam, it is not 
allowed to  force  anyone to embrace Islam, but rather has  duty to monitor and 
prevent those who seek to deny people their freedom of belief. 
Under Islamic law, a Muslim male who marries a Christian or Jewish wife 
cannot compel her into  Islam.  Also, the recognition of the statues of non Muslims 
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 • 
within  the  Islamic  state  indicates  that  Islamic  law  does  not  advocate forced 
conversions   to  Islam.   According to  the  twelfth  century  Hanbali  jurist,  Ibn 
Qudamah: 
It is not permissible to force a non-believer into embracing Islam. For instance 
if a non-Muslim citizen (Dhimmi) or a protected alien (Musta'min)  is forced to 
embrace Islam, he will not be considered as a Muslim except his embrace of Islam 
is of his own choice ...  The authority for this prohibition of coercion is the words of 
God Most High that says:  There is no compulsion in Religion.
27   
Apostasy from 
 
Islam is  a topical issue under the concept of freedom of thought, conscience, and 
,. 
religion because  of  its  classification as  a  crime  punishable with  death under 
traditional Islamic law.  This apparently contradicts the basic principle of non- 
compulsion advanced above.  It also conflicts with the international human rights 
understanding of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
 
Ibn Taimiyyah had observed that some of successors to the companions of the 
Prophet Muhammad known as al-Tabi'un  such as Ibrahim al-Nakha'I (d.95.A.H) 
and Sufyan al-Tsauri (d.161.A.H) held the view that a Muslim apostate must never 
be sentenced  to death but should be invited back to Islam.
28 
Both el-Awa and 
 
Kamali seek to establish that apostasy simpliciter neither constituted a hadd-type 
offence nor attracted the death penalty. They both cited the twelfth century Maliki 
jurist, Abu AL-Walid alBaji  as stating that apostasy is 'a sin for which there is no
 
hadd punishment.29 
 
Although Hamidullah included  the crime of apostasy in his
 
Muslim Conduct State, he went to indicate that: 'The basis of Muslim polity being 
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 religious and not ethnological or linguistic to appreciate the reason for penalizing 
this act of apostasy. For it constitutes a politico-religious rebellion. 30 
Contemporary  Muslims jurists  and scholars  thus differ  as to whether 
apostasy simpliciter in the form of a person denouncing the Islamic faith is a hadd- 
type offence at all, and also as to whether it attracted the death penalty. Many of the 
scholars  and jurist define apostasy in terms of rebellion against state,  where a 
Muslim-subject  of the Islamic state after denouncing  Islam joins with those who 
take arms against the Islamic state and thus commits a political offence against the 
State.
31
 
 
The contention  is that apostasy simpliciter,  in the sense of an individual 
denouncing Islam without more, wherever mentioned in the quran does not stipulate 
any worldly punishment for apostasy was based on a report Tradition of the prophet 
that said:  'anyone who changes his religion, kill him.  Some Muslim scholars have 
however identified  this tradition as a solitary (ahad) tradition while others allege 
weakness in its transmission  (isnad). It has been contended also that there is no 
precedent of the Prophet compelling anyone into Islam or sentencing anyone to 
death for apostasy simpliciter.  El-Awa thus concluded that the quran prescribes no 
punishment  in this life for apostasy, and The Prophet recognized apostasy as a sin 
for which there was ta 'zir (discretionary) punishment.
32  
Thus this placed the matter 
 
within the legislative discretion of the Islamic State. 
 
Under Islamic law, examples of expressions and speech that amount to abuse 
of the right are specifically stated  by the quran and some prophetic tradition. 
Kamali classified these sharia limitations  on freedom of expression into  'moral 
restraints  and 'legal  restraints.  The former are essentially  'addressed to be the 
conscience of the believer; and include,  inter alia, defamation, backbiting, lying, 
derision, exposing the weakness of others, and acrimonious disputation. The latter 
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 are backed by  specific  sanctions include,  inter  alia, public utterance  of evil or 
hurtful speech, slanderous accusation, libel, insult, cursing, seditious speech, and 
blasphemy.
33  
Of all these sharia restraints, blasphemy is perhaps portrayed as the 
most controversial limitation on freedom of expression under international human 
rights  law  as  was  demonstrated  through  the  reactions  attracted  by  the  Salman 
Rushdie affair  from both international human rights advocates and Islamic jurists 
and scholars worldwide. 
Blasphemy is broadly referred to under Islamic law as sabb Allah aw sabb al- rasul, 
meaning 'Reviling  God or Reviling the Messenger'.  Blasphemy overlaps with apostasy  
in  the  sense  that  an  act  of blasphemy  by  a Muslim  also  amounts  to apostasy. 
Thus classical Islamic jurists often paired the.two together  in their legal treatises  and 
prescribed  the death penalty  for both  under traditional  Islamic law. Blasphemy  is 
however  separable  from apostasy  especially when  committed  by a non-Muslim 
against Islam. Kamali concluded that the quran has made no reference to the death 
penalty for blasphemy, and the text does not warrant the conclusion that it is a quranic 
obligation, or a prescribed punishment or a mandate. On the contrary, we would submit 
that the general language of the Quran can only sustain the broad conclusion  that  the  
perpetrator  of blasphemy  disgraces  himself and  invokes  the curse  of  God  upon  
himself,  and  that  it  is  a  criminal  offence  which  carries  no 
prescribed   mandatory   punishment,   and  as  such,  automatically   falls  under  the 
category of ta 'zir  offences,  whose punishment  may be determined  by the head of 
state in competent judicial  authorities.
34
 
 
The Encyclopedia  of Religion and Ethics defines blasphemy  in Islam broadly 
as 'All  utterances  expressive  of contempt for Allah (God) Himself,  for His names, 
attributes, laws, commands  or prohibitions (and) All scoffing at Muhammad  or any 
other prophets or apostles  of Allah.
35  
Being a religious law, Kamali  points out that 
 
the prohibition of blasphemy  under Islamic law is mainly to 'defend the dogma and 
belief-structure  of Islam'.  (217) It is noteworthy  that Islam recognizes  reciprocally 
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respect  to  other  faiths  under  its  prohibition  of blasphemy.  The  quran  enjoins 
Muslims also 'not to revile those whom they worship beside God, lest they revile 
God wrongfully without knowledge. Thus We (God) have  made fair-seeming  t 
each people its  own doing; to their lord is their final return  and He shall inform 
them of all that they did' .(Q.6:108). 
The sharia prohibition of blasphemy as a limitation to freedom of expression 
thus aims at protecting the sensibilities  and beliefs of the Muslim community in 
particular and that of other faiths in general. Seen in that perspective, that limitatio 
is explicable within the proviso of article 19 (3) of the ICCPR on the protection of 
public order or morals. The ability of blasphemous expressions to incite Muslims t 
public disorder  is evidence,  for example, by the upheavals  in many parts of the 
world that followed the publication  of Salmand Rushdie's  Satanic Verses, which 
was considered as being offensive to the religious sensibilities of Muslims not only 
by Muslims, but even by non-Muslim  religious leaders. There is need however in 
this realm always carefully and objectively to distinguish  constructive  reasonable 
intellectual critiques of religious interpretation from expressions that insult or revile 
the sensibilities of reasonable of expression. Maududi has pointed out in that re  ard 
that Islam does  not  prohibits  decent  intellectual debate  and  religious  discussio .    ; 
what it prohibits is evil speech that encroaches upon the religious beliefs of others. 
36 
 
Applying  the margin of appreciation  doctrine to a case of blasphemy  ur d .r 
 
Article 10 of the European Convention,  the European Court of Human Rights he 
 
in the case  of Otto-Preminger-Institut  v. Austria that  seizure  and forfeit  re of ,.. 
blasphemous  film in which God, Jesus Christ, and the Virgin  May were ridicu e.d 
did not violate the author's right to freedom of expression  guaranteed under arti  le 
10 of the European Convention. The Court observed, inter alia, that: 
The  Court  cannot  disregard  the  fact  that  Roman  Catholic  religion  is  the 
religion  of  the  overwhelming   majority  of  Tyroleans.   In  seizing  the  film,  the 
Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that 
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 some people  should  feel  the  object  of attacks  on  their  religious  beliefs  in  an 
unwarranted and offensive manner. It is in the first place for the national authorities, 
who are better placed than the international judge,  to assess the need for such a 
measure in the light of the situation obtaining locally at a given time.  In all the 
circumstances  of  the  present  case,  the  court  does  not  consider  that  Austrian 
authorities can be regarded as having overstepped their margin of appreciation  in 
this respect. 
3 7
 
 
It is submitted that the HRC should follow a similar approach in considering 
issues of moral and religious sensibilities, especially in its interpretation of Article 
19 of the ICCPR. This will  facilitate an appropriate balance between  respect  for 
religious  beliefs  and  right  to  freedom  of expression  under international  human 
rights law. 
38
 
 
 
E. Forgiveness is prioritized than punishment 
 
Five  specific  restrictions  on the  death penalty  may  be  identified  from  the 
provisions of article 6 (2) to (6). The first is that death penalty may not be imposed 
except only for the most serious crimes and in accordance with the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the crime. The second restriction on the death penalty 
under article 6 is that no deprivation of life must be contrary to the provisions  of the 
covenant and to the Convention  on the Prevention and Punishment  of the crime of 
Genocide. Third restriction is that the death penalty can only be carried out pursuant 
to a final judgment  rendered  by a competent court.  The fourth  restriction  is that 
anyone   sentenced   and  may  be  granted  amnesty,   pardon,   or  commutation   of 
sentence.  The  fifth  restriction  is that the death penalty  shall  not  be  imposed  for 
crimes committed  by persons  below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried 
out pregnant women. 
Under traditional  Islamic law the death penalty is prescribed  basically  for the 
offences  of murder,  adultery,  apostasy, and armed/highway  robbery.  The views of 
the HRC put all these offences,  except murder, outside the Committee's  definition 
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 of most serious crimes'  under the Covenant. The argument of Muslim jurists and 
scholars is that the manner and circumstances in which the stated offences must be 
committed  to attract the death penalty  makes them very serious  offences under 
Islamic law. Murder attracts the death penalty on retaliatory grounds of life for life. 
Armed/highway robbery attracts the death penalty where it results in the death of 
the victim. Adultery, basically, requires the unanimous eyewitness evidence of four, 
sane, Muslim adult male witnesses to the sexual  act. For apostasy to attract the 
death penalty, many scholars now define it in the context of sedition or treason 
against the State, and not merely as apostasy simpliciter. 
The HRC has also observed that the provisions of Article 6 (2) and (6) suggest 
the desirability of abolishing the death penalty  under international law.  There is 
however no unanimity amongst the States of the world yet on the abolition of the 
death penalty. While some states are considered as 'abolitionist States' others are 
considered as non-abolitionist States. Apart from the republic of Azerbaijan, and 
recently Turkey no other Muslim state has abolished the death penalty or become a 
Party to  the  Second  Optional  Protocol (OP2) to  the  ICCPR  adopted  in  1989 
specifically aimed  at  abolishing the death penalty.  Since  the  quran  specifically 
prescribes the death penalty as punishment for certain crimes, Islamic jurist would 
consider any direct legislation against its legality  as being outside the scope of 
human legislation under the sharia. 
Islamic jurist  often  cite the quran verses which says:  'In the  law of qisas 
(retribution) there is (saving of) life  for you, 0 people of understanding; that you 
may restrain yourselves',  to argue that the  death penalty for murder  is  itself a 
deterrent and a legal protection for the right to life and thus it will impugn the right 
to life to abolish it. Most Muslim States who apply Islamic criminal law only try to 
avoid the death penalty through either procedural or commutative provisions 
available within the sharia instead of direct prohibition of it. Islamic law demands 
strict  evidential  requirement  for  capital  offences.   This  would  often  lead,  for 
instance,   to  payment   of  blood  money  for  murder,  and  discretionary   (ta'zir) 
• 
punishment for the other capital offences in place of affecting the death penalty.  In 
the case of murder,  the  sharia allows for the alternative of blood  money by the 
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offender  to  the  heirs  of the  victim  in  lieu  of the  death  penalty.  The  Prophet 
Muhammad is also reported to have recommended that the death penalty should be 
avoided as much as possible. 
Islamic  law indeed  recognize fair hearing  is  all aspect  of court, including 
capital offence cases. The Hanafi jurist contended that since Islamic law does not 
discriminate between  Muslims and non-Muslims  in the punishment  for theft and 
other offences, the same rule must apply in the case of murder. The Hanafi view is 
more consistent with other traditions of the Prophet on equality of human beings 
and also compatible  with the principle of non-discrimination  under the covenant. 
The prohibitions of genocidal capital punishment under the Covenant is also in full 
concordance  with the sanctity of life under Islamic  law,  Article 2 (b) of the OIC 
Cairo Declaration on Human rights in Islam provides that: 'It is forbidden to resort 
to such means as may result in the genocidal annihilation of mankind'. 
Islamic  law  differentiates  the judgment  (qada) of a competent  court from a 
 
legal opinion (given)  by a jurisconsult  (mufti)  on a particular  issue.  A final and 
executable  judgment   can  only  be  given  by  a  competent  judge   after  the  full 
consideration of a case in accordance with due process oflaw. A fatwa, on the other 
hand, is only a legal opinion given by a mufti, which is neither legally binding nor 
executable.  On legal matters  of public law, only competent judges  may consult a 
mufti for a legal opinion to help them reach a legal decision on matters before court. 
 
Thus under Islamic law,  a mufti or any Islamic leaders has no legal competence to 
give a binding  fatwa Imposing the death penalty  or any other punishment  for any 
offence without  the case first being tried by a competent  court  and affording the 
accused person opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the law. 
Based  on Quranic  verse that recommend  and extol the act of pardoning  the 
wrongdoer,  Islamic law also recognize the principle of amnesty. Under Islamic law 
amnesty  may  be  granted  by the Ruler under  the  principle  of haqq al-afw an al- 
uqubah (The  right  to pardon  from punishment).  The state  may  pardon  any ta 'zir 
punishment  provided  that the victim's right  is  not undermined.  According  to the 
Hanafi  school,  hudud  punishment  cannot  be pardoned  by the  State  because 'it  is 
'right of God'.  The other schools however hold that only the hudud punishment  for 
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 zina and theft may not be pardoned by the State after the court is seized of the case. 
Their argument in the case of zina is that the difficulty of proving zina through 
eyewitnesses is enough mitigation on the crime requiring no additional amnesty if 
an offender  could be so heinous to commit the offence  in the broad glare of four 
male witnesses.
39 
Based on the quranic provision on homicide, some Islamic jurists 
consider remission as the better alternative to the death penalty in homicide cases. 
While the right to commute the death penalty in homicide cases for blood money 
lies principally with the victim's  heirs, the State may encourage· such amnesty on 
the part of the heirs. It was reported in one tradition that whenever a case of qisas 
was brought before the prophet Muhammad, he recommended  pardon/" Since, the 
head of state in democratic system chosen by people, than the rights of pardon may 
be carried out by the head of the state.  This taking  over is not contradict to any 
Islamic tenet. 
The execution of the death penalty against pregnant women is also prohibited 
under Islamic law.  The same exemption extends even to a woman breast-feeding a 
child until the child is weaned. A child will not also be liable to death penalty under 
Islamic law based on a tradition in which the Prophet Muhammad  stated, inter alia, 
that a child is free from responsibility until he attains maturity. The only difference 
is that it  is  possible  for a child to attain maturity before the age of eighteen years 
under traditional Islamic jurisprudence. 
Article  (7)  no  one  shall  be  subjected  to  torture  or  to  cruel,  inhuman  or 
 
• degrading treatment  or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without 
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. 
The  severity  of some criminal  punishment  under  Islamic  law has however 
been brought into issue within international human rights discourse. Bannerman has 
observed for example  that 'it would be foolish to deny that in western eyes today, 
amputations,   executions,   stoning,   and   corporal   punishment    are   brutal'.   And 
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 according to Mayer 'laws  imposing  penalties  like amputations, cross amputations, 
and crucifixions would seem to be in obvious violation of article 7 (ICCPR). 
Islamic  law prescribes fixed punishment called hudud for certain offences, 
retributive punishment called qisas for other offences and discretionary punishment 
called ta 'zir  for certain others. The qisas and ta 'zir  are variable punishment and 
within the discretion of the victim of the offence  (or the heirs) and the judge 9or 
State) respectively.  A Muslim State's conformity to  an international standard of 
punishment  in  crimes  that attract  qisas or  ta 'zir  punishment  under  Islamic  law 
therefore depends  on the political will and other international  consideration of a 
particular State. The tension with international human  rights law is essentially in 
respect of the hudud punishment which are fixed and invariable as long as the crime 
is fully established as provided by the Islamic law. 
The  hudud   punishment  are  generally  prescribed   for  six  offences  under 
traditional Islamic law.  They are amputation of a hand for theft, death, crucifixion, 
cross amputation  of hand and foot or banishment  for rebellion  or armed robbery 
(hirabah);  stoning  to  death for adultery  and one  hundred  slash  for cornification 
(zina); eighty  lashes for false accusation of unchastity  (qadhf); death for apostasy 
(riddah); and forty or eighty lashes for intoxication (sharb al-khamr). While there is 
consensus  among  Islamic jurists  on the  first  four  punishments,  there  are  some 
differences about the offences of intoxication and apostasy. 
While   the   need  to  punish  those  guilty  of  crimes   is   appreciated  under 
international human rights law, the contention has been that offenders and criminals 
are still human  beings  and must therefore be treated  with some dignity. Thus the 
punishment  for crimes must not be excessively  severe, degrading,  or inhuman but 
rather aim at reforming the offender.  While Muslims are under religious obligations 
to  believe  in  the  divine  nature  of the  hudud  punishment   and  not  question  its 
severity,  the same  cannot be said of non-Muslims.  Since criminal  punishment  are 
generally  not  restricted  to  Muslims  alone  within  the  Muslim  State  it  becomes 
• 
necessary  to examine  the principle  of the Islamic  criminal  punishment  outside the 
scope of strict divine penology. 
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From a pragmatic perspective, the factors that are usually considered in the 
prescription of punishment for crime are: the interest of the society, that of the 
victim, and that of the offender. Thus, penological policy is usually based on the 
theories of deterrence, retribution, and reform. Although there may be some 
overlapping, basically deterrence may be viewed as serving  the interest of society, 
retribution that of the victim, and reform that of the offender, There could be indeed be 
a difficulty in defining a balance between these interests in the prescription of 
punishment for particular offences.  For instance, while a generality of opinion in a 
particular  society  may  reveal  that  a  particular  punishment  is  too  severe  for  a 
particular  offence,  the  opinion  of victims  of that  offence  in the  same  society, 
depending  on  their  ordeals,  might  reveal  that  no  punishment  is too  severe for 
perpetrators of such offences.  It may be argued too that offenders  are products of 
the society, so it is their reform that must be given priority in the determination of a 
penal policy. 
Islamic law aims at an ideal society.  But if, despite the deterrent nature of the 
severe punishment,  the offences still occur, there would then arise the question of 
whether or not the society has played a contributory role for the commitment of the 
offence. Thus, even in the enforcement of the hudud, the rule also is that there must 
exist an ideal Islamic society.  Where it can be reasonably proved that the offender 
was a product of the society's sociological problems then his interest must be taken 
into consideration  and the hudud punishment  may be mitigated.  There is evidence 
•                                           that the Prophet  suspended the hadd punishment  for the theft during war, and the 
second caliph Umar  suspended its enforcement  at a time of widespread  famine in 
Medina. Abu Yusuf indicates that circumstances could make it necessary to relax or 
suspend the enforcement  of the hudud punishment  by the ruling authority.  It could 
be argued therefore that, while to Muslims the prescription of the hudud punishment 
• 
is  not questionable;  its  application by the state is however  not in isolation of other 
 
sociological  factors within the State. The determination  of the enabling or inhibiting 
.. sociological  factors for the application of the hudud punishment  is, as shown by the 
examples  above,  left to the discretion of the State to be exercised  in good faith and 
the best interest of society and the populace (maslahah). 
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While the hudud punishment is deterrent in nature for the public interest, the 
ta'zir punishment, due to the wide authority that the state has in its prescription, 
provide means for punishment that aim for criminal's reform. The qisas punishment 
complete  the cycle by taking the interest of the victim into consideration  in the 
enforcement of retributive  punishment.  It could be argued therefore that the three 
tiers  of  punishment under  Islamic   law   are  interpretable   pragmatically to 
accommodate modem  enological  principles   depending on  the  political and 
humanitarian will of the ruling authority. 
Against the foregoing background, the conflict between criminal punishment 
under Islamic law and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment 
under international human rights law can be addressed from two dimensions. The 
first dimension concerns the punishment of non-hudud offences. Since the State has 
discretion  under Islamic  law  to  impose  less  harsh punishment for non-hudud 
offences, Muslim States can thus effectively exercise that discretion in cognizance of 
their international human rights law obligations, and directly proscribe their non- 
hudud punishment that violate the prohibition of cruel, inhuman,  and degrading 
punishment. It  must be  observed however those apart from religious factors, 
developing nations, for many reasons that include resource limitations, do often 
prefer an  effectively  deterrent,  'harsh'  criminal punishment over  a  'humane' 
reformative one even where the legislative  authority lies completely  within the 
prerogative of the State. 
The second dimension concerns the hudud offences,  which are specifically 
prescribed by direct injunctions  of the quran.  Al-Nairn has observed in respect of 
the hudud punishment that'  in all Muslim societies, the possibility of human 
judgment regarding the appropriateness or cruelty of a punishment decreed by God 
is  simply out of the question', and that neither Islamic re-interpretation nor cross- 
• 
cultural dialogue is likely to lead to their total abolition ...  as a matter of Islamic 
 
/aw.
41   
Questioning the hudud punishment  is  considered as questioning the divine 
wisdom  underlying them and impugning  the divinity of the Quran and the Theo 
centric nature of Islamic  law.  From an Islamic  legal perspective the conflict may 
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 , 
however be addressed indirectly through procedural means. Islamic legalist concede 
the fact that   it is lawful to utilize procedural device to delay the hudud without 
impugning the law, the Prophet having advised that one should avert the hudud 
punishment  in case  of  doubt because  error  in  clemency  is  better  than  error in 
imposing punishment
42
.  Mayer has however raised the question that 'if one attempts 
 
such a compromise,  how does one go about defending  it against fundamentalist 
critics, who are likely to accuse one of failing to take divine commands seriously?" 
..                                    That question highlights the susceptibility of the issue, but can be addressed through 
internal dialogue within Muslim States and among Muslim Jurists. It is established 
by reference  to  classical  jurisprudence  that  averting  hudud  punishment  through 
procedural means does not amount to impugning divine.commands.  Such aversion 
does not necessarily mean that there would be no punishment at all, but that through 
adherence to strict and lawful procedural rules of Islamic law ta'zir punishment are 
applied instead of the hudud punishments for difficulty of proof. 
43
 
 
Although the obligations parties under international human rights instrument 
often require  direct  legislation  abolishing punishment  considered  cruel,  inhuman, 
and degrading,  such direct legislation  can divest  a ruling  authority of its Islamic 
legitimacy in many parts of the Muslim world today.  While most Muslim States do 
not  currently   apply  the  hudud  punishment  they  also  do  not  have  legislation 
specifically  prohibiting  the punishments. The reverence of the Quranic injunctions 
by Muslims  thus puts at a crossroads the human  Rights  Committee's demand on 
Muslim   States   to   abolish   the   hudud   punishment   directly.   With   the   current 
resurgence and restoration of Islamic law in many Muslim States, it is more feasible 
•                                          
to seek for reconciliation  between  the hudud  punishments  and the  prohibition  of 
 
cruel,  inhuman,  and degrading  punishment  under  international  human  rights  law 
indirectly through legal procedural shields available within Islamic law.
44
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 D. Recognition of International Boundaries 
 
Unlike  in  Islamic  classical history,  at this time the world is  divided into 
nation-states with view virgin tracts of land to be claimed, so it seems easy to define 
territorial  boundaries.  But, the task becomes somewhat arduous when we try to 
approach it in terms of ethical perspective that has religious sanction. 
With the rise of an international  system based on sovereign nation-states, 
Muslims have been forced to adapt Islamic principles to modem conditions. Dar 
Islam  is today largely a cultural-religious construct,  an ideal of the spiritual, if not 
political, unity of Muslims around the world. The political reality is of the existence 
of some  fifty six  independent  Muslim states  which frequently find themselves 
bitterly divided and sometimes at war with each other.    ·., 
Still,  significant  moral issues  arise in any attempt to reconcile a world of 
sovereign territorial  states with the Islamic  ideals  of a universal commonwealth 
including diverse races, religions, and linguistic groups. 
In the early centuries of Islam, Muslim communities traveled easily from one 
geographical boundary to another in search of their livelihood. Political frontiers 
meant little  in  their search for food and water.  Individual Muslims also traveled 
easily and widely,  sometimes holding positions  in government of various states 
without the complications of immigration and naturalization laws and regulations. 
Even non-Muslims were allowed to travel freely within and between the Muslim 
states. The Muslim center of learning in Cordova, Granada, Fez, Salemo,  Cairo, 
Baghdad, Damascus, and Bukhara were frequented by scholars and students of 
various religious persuasions from all over the world. It was not uncommon for a 
noted religious personality or jurist to wander easily from one center to another, an 
itinerant  scholar  whose passport was his scholastic  reputation.  Two of the best 
known  figures from Islamic history are Ibnu Khaldun, historian and jurist  who 
taught  and  held  government posts in  Tunis, Fez,  Granada,  and Cairo,  and Ibn 
Batuta, whose name is  synonymous in the Muslim World with the irrepressible 
traveler. 
The  classical   Islamic   approach  to  questions  of  diversity  and  political 
autonomy beyond dar-Islam must be studied with reference to the Islamic theory of 
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 international  relations, known as  siyar.  This  worldview was the  product of 
persistent persecution of Muslims, first by the Meccan idolaters, principally by the 
rich tribe of Quraish and its allies; then by the frequent betrayals of non-Muslim 
tribes of Medina;  followed in the final years of the Prophet's life by conflict with 
the Byzantine Empire to the north. The unceasing hostility towards the Muslims by 
their non-Muslims neighbor forced the early Muslims to struggle for survival and 
thus, war and fighting became an integral  part of the relationship with non- 
Muslims. As a by product of struggle, Muslim jurists took excessive recourse of the 
concept of naskh (abrogationO in formulating their views on external relations with 
non-Muslim enemies, and ignored some of the very basic quranic verses dealing 
with persuasion (husna), patience (sabr), tolerance (la ikrah), and the right to self 
determination (lasta alayhim bi-musaytir), in favor of an aggressive conception of 
jihad. 
 
Since fiqh is the interpretation of the quran and sunna, there has not been 
unanimity of opinion among various schools of thought on all issues, especially 
regarding siyar and jihad.  Siyar  describes the rules of conduct for Muslims in 
dealing with the unbelievers of enemy territory  or those with whom they  have 
i 
established treaties  of  nonaggression.   The.  quranic verses  and  the  prophetic 
 
traditions on jihad address how Muslims should respond to the hostilities of the 
enemies of Islam. The principles of siyar follow from them. 
The conditions for and conduct of jihad  are issues  that have historically 
created controversy among Muslim jurists.  Islamic legal  precedents that were set 
during the time of the Prophet and his immediate successors, the four caliphs served 
the Muslim community well until the advent of the Umayyad dynasty in A.D.661. 
The people of the newly conquered territories could not shed entirely their pre- 
Islamic customs and culture and acted, in some cases, contrary to the standard set 
forth by the jurists and the government. For all practical purposes, from the rise of 
the Umayyad through the rest of dynasties of Muslim history, fiqh more often than 
• 
not ceased to represent actual  policies or regulations  of the Muslim state.  Fiqh 
essentially has  been  nothing  more than  legal  opinions of  various  scho ars  of 
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 divergent schools of jurisprudence, and they differ on the nature of jihad and the 
conduct of international relations generally. 
A few additional related concepts need to be defined here before we 
investigate the principles of jihad  and siyar.  Beyond the frontiers of dar Islam, 
medieval jurist conceived the existence of other territories or realms, including dar 
alharb, dar al-aman, and dar al-ahd,  otherwise  referred to as dar al-sulh  (non- 
Muslim territory which pledges through treaty to acknowledge Muslim sovereignty, 
but maintain local autonomy by paying some land taxes in lieu of jizya, or poll tax). 
The harbis, or inhabitants of dar al-harb, are enemies of Islam and, as such, 
have  no  right  to  enter  into  Muslims  territories  without  express  permission. 
However, a harbi who receives a guarantee of safe passage (aman) from even the 
poorest and the weak.est Muslim is secure  from harm for at least one year. At the 
expiry of that date, the harbi is  bound to depart-unless,  of course he or  she 
converts to Islam and becomes a part of the Muslim umma (community or society). 
The inhabitants of dar al-aman, the must'mins, are treated according to the 
conditions of treaty  between  them  and the Muslim state.  The  musta'mins  are 
governed by their own laws, are exempt from taxes, and enjoy other privileges. 
Historically, the question of whether or not the Islamic state (dar al-Islam)  is 
obligated to wage jihad against dar al-harb raised contradictory opinions from the 
various sunni schools. Abu Hanifa, and Sufyan al-Tsauri state that fighting against 
non-Muslims is not obligatory obligator unless they themselves initiate it, in which 
case it becomes obligatory on Muslims to fight back. 
The jurist  are also divided on the issue  of whether or not a harbi who is 
granted aman to  enter dar al-Islam but who commits a crime while  in Islamic 
territory is subject to Islamic legal punishment; Abu Hanifa asserts that such harbis 
are not subject to Muslim legal punishment, al-Shafi'i says they are. Abu Sulayman, a 
contemporary scholars of Islamic approaches to international relations said; "The 
parts of fiqh on al-jihad and related matters such as al-Jizyah-actually deal with 
matters  that  are  highly  political  and  can  hardly  be  looked  upon  as  simply 
enforcement or the carrying out of opinions of the ulama, who had become more 
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 and more removed  from the center of power  and decision making.
45  
Ironically, 
though, in modem times some of the Muslim countries even treat Muslims from 
outside their political boundaries as if they are harbis. 
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